The Valour and the Horror

Blitz Taken from the German word Bliztkreig ('lightning war'), this was the British name for the Luftwaffe's sustained night attacks against their cities from August 1940 to midway 1941.

The Blitz began as the daylight battle of Britain was nearing its climax and at a time when the invasion of the UK, for which the battle was a necessary preliminary, was still on the German agenda. For the Germans, who never committed more than a third of their twin-engined bomber force to daylight raids during the battle of Britain, it was first an extension of the battle-in that they wanted to destroy British aircraft factories and thus deny the RAF the reinforcements it required-and then a war of attrition when they failed to achieve the necessary air superiority to launch SEALION.

If an invasion was not immediately possible, then surely, German planners surmised, the UK could be bombed into submission by destroying its means of communication and supply as well as its armaments factories and, if necessary, by terrorizing its citizens.

However, despite Hitler's directive of 5 September 'for disruptive attacks on the population and air defences of major British cities, including London, by day and night', the primary objective of the Luftwaffe remained to destroy the RAF and the factories that sustained it. But now that London was a legitimate target it was decided that Air Fleet 2, stationed in the Low Countries, would carry out daylight raids on the Capital's infrastructure- in fact, it participated in the night raids as well-while Air Fleet 3, based in France, would attack at night 'until the docks and all supply- and power-sources of the city have been annihilated'. But by October, when it became apparent that the battle of Britain had been lost, the attacks became increasingly a matter of inflicting terror and exhaustion in the ebbing hope that British morale would collapse.

From the British point of view the raids were simply terror tactics and were presented as such by war correspondents and propaganda to an increasingly sympathetic American public. At first there was little the British could do to oppose them. At that time few of the defending antiaircraft (A-A) batteries were equipped with fire-control radar: searchlights were rarely effective at altitudes greater than 3,600 m. (12,000 ft.); few night-fighters were fitted with Al (airborne interception) radar; and ground controlled interception radar (GCI). which tracked incoming aircraft overland, was still being developed. It was, therefore, unusual for a raider to be seen by the defenders and rare for one to be shot down.