The Valour and the Horror

Churchill's strategy for 1942 required the navy and the air force to carry the burden of the Commonwealth war effort. In 1940 he had advocated priority for the strategic bombing of Germany, arguing that "the navy can lose us the war but only the air force can win it.... The fighters are our salvation but the bombers alone provide the means of victory."

By the end of I94I he was much less confident that air power alone could be decisive. Bomber Command had begun a new offensive in July 1942 aimed at "dislocating the German transportation system and destroying the morale of the civil population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular." This meant attacks on targets in the Ruhr industrial zone when moonlight permitted, and the bombing of cities on the Rhine when darkness required an easier method of identification. Other German cities were also listed as prospective targets.

Despite a sustained effort, which cost Bomber Command heavy casualties, little was accomplished by the offensive. Reports from Germany, including those of neutral observers, cast doubt on RAF damage claims, and the British Air Staff's own investigation, the Butt Report, demonstrated that just one aircraft in five got within five miles of its target. Over the Ruhr only one in ten dropped bombs "within the 7, square miles surrounding the target." The problem was not target identification but navigation to the general area where the objective was located.

Churchill expressed great reservations, informing Air Marshal Charles Portal that it was a mistake to claim too much for bombing. Exaggerated estimates of the effects of air attack had "depressed the statesmen responsible for pre&endash;war policy and played a definite part in the desertion of Czechoslovakia...." There was, Churchill insisted, "no certain method of winning the war," they could only persevere.

After a disastrous raid on Berlin in November when thirty&endash;seven bombers were lost in severe weather, the Prime Minister insisted on a change in strategy. "There is no point at this time," he wrote, "in bombing Berlin.... Losses which are acceptable in battle or for some decisive military objective ought not to be incurred merely as a matter of routine." The RAF was to pause and "re&endash;gather their strength for the spring."

With the future role of Bomber Command in doubt, both the army and the navy pressed claims for new priorities. General Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, sought an expansion of the Army Co&endash;operation role, while the Royal Navy pressed the claims of the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command. The ensuing intense debate was not resolved until July I94I when Churchill, his eyes on the new German offensive in Russia and his forthcoming visit to Moscow, supported an expansion of Bomber Command from thirty&endash;two to fifty squadrons.

The RAF would employ these additional bombers in a new strategy devised in the winter of I94I&endash;42. The Air Staff had concluded that, even with the aid of new navigation devices, night&endash;bombers could only locate target areas such as large towns and cities. A list of forty&endash;three German industrial centres, with a combined population or fifteen million, was drawn up with aiming points m city centres, not rail yards or factories. Bomber Command was to hit what it could find when it could find it.

In February 1942, the RAF found the right man to implement the strategy. Air Marshal Arthur Harris had played no role in the formulation of the policy, but he enthusiastically supported it. His problem was that Bomber Command did not have the numbers or types of aircraft available to carry out the "area&endash;bombing" directive. On March I, 1942, 167 four&endash;engined bombers were operational, but only 20 Halifax's and 4 Lancasters were available.

Harris proceeded carefully, husbanding his resources and experimenting with tactics. "Gee," a navigational device while permitted pi lots to fix their position from a radio&endash;pulse receiver, had enough range for the Ruhr or North Sea ports. Gee allowed bombers to reach the approximate area of the target even in poor weather and helped Harris to organize "bomber streams," which concentrated aircraft, reducing the chances of night&endash;fighter interception and the time&endash;over&endash;target for bombing.

Harris staged a series of spectacular raids designed to demonstrate what could be done. The first, against the Renault truck plant west of Paris, was brilliantly executed, destroying 40 per cent of the factory. Next was Lubeck, a German port on the Baltic Coast, which was attacked with incendiary bombs. There was little war industry in Lubeck; the aim was to lower German morale and demonstrate that there were costs involved in attempts to conquer Europe. Cologne, on the Rhine, was selected for the first "Thousand Bomber Raid," and all those who had endured three years of unchecked Nazi aggression applauded this bold stroke.

The Royal Canadian Air Force officially joined the battle in April I94I when No. 405 Squadron was formed. Hundreds of RCAF aircrew were serving in RAF squadrons; now a separate Canadian air force was to be created. By the time of the Cologne raid five RCAF squadrons, including No. 425 "Alouette" squadron, a well&endash;publicized

French&endash;Canadian unit, flew missions over Germany. These and other Canadian squadrons were equipped with the twin&endash;engined Wellingtons and the then "unsatisfactory Halifax," giving rise to complaints that Harris favoured the RAF. However, as the Canadian official history note. seniority, not nationality, was the guiding principle in allocating newer Lancaster bombers.

RCAF squadrons suffered the same steady drain of casualties as other elements of Bomber Command. Out of every 100 aircrew, 51 were killed in operations, 9 were killed in training, 12 became prisoners of war, 3 were wounded, and just 25 made it through their tour safely. Twenty percent of those who served in Bomber Command were Canadians.