The Valour and the Horror

As the war progressed all kinds of Electronic warfare devices were brought into play to confuse German radar and thus misdirect the German night-fighters scrambled to intercept the bomber-stream. 'spoof raids were also started to draw them off from the bomber-stream. These were first employed on a large scale during the air offensive against Berlin, which started in August 1943. Non-operational aircraft were assembled over the UK and flown towards the target area before, or simultaneously with, the bomber-stream. If they timed it right they turned back after the fighter defences had been committed to attacking them but before they could themselves be caught, and the main bomber-stream was able to avoid attack. "Spoof " raids were also mounted by small numbers of the bomber version of the Mosquito, operational from mid&endash;1942, which was too fast to be caught. When bombing real targets Mosquitoes often attacked in two formations, one at low level co-ordinated with the other making a shallow dive, a tactic which split the defences very effectively.

Because it employed precision bombing during the day against its targets the USAAF faced different problems in devising methods to protect its aircraft. Until long&endash;range fighters became operational in early 1944 the bombers had to rely on their own armament and employ formations which gave maximum mutual defensive firepower. To this end the numbers of aircraft in a formation, and the compactness of the formation, increased as the war progressed. As both the B17 Fortresses and the B24 Liberators were heavily armed it was initially believed that they were capable of fighting their way to and from their targets in the Eighth USAAF's basic formation of six aircraft. Four of these formations flown together, but as much as 6.4 km. (4 m.) apart, allowed plenty of manoeuvrability when bombing but proved quite inadequate for defence. So in September 1942 18-aircraft groups were introduced which brought the aircraft closer together and concentrated their firepower. But it was somewhat inflexible and when the formation turned it tended to cause stragglers-the death knell for any bomber. Though this was revised in December 1942 German fighters still caused heavy losses and from March 1943 the 54 aircraft combat wing formation began being used. Three 18 aircraft groups were brought together into a compact unit which was about 2,000 m. (2,200 yd.) wide and 800 m. (880 yd.) deep with 550 m. (600 yd.) between the first and last aircraft. This increased mutual fire support considerably but required new bombing techniques, including Pattern bombing. The 'tucked in' 54 aircraft wing formation followed soon afterwards which squeezed the aircraft even closer together so that they used nearly 75% less air space. This presented a truly formidable concentration of firepower as well as a reduced target for the head-on fighter attacks that the Luftwaffe had developed. This formation continued to be used until the introduction of the long-range fighter in early 1944, and then the appearance of massed antiaircraft batteries that defended German cities in early 1945, each of which prompted a change of formation. With fighters to accompany bombers throughout a raid, self-protection became a lower priority than maximising the use of those with the latest Electronic navigation systems which were in short supply. One of these aircraft led a squadron of twelve, with three squadrons flying together in an arrow-shaped group. Finally, in February 1945, four squadrons of nine aircraft each were flown in one group. This made them easy to protect and as each squadron flew at a different height made it difficult for the German gunners to shift fire from one squadron to another.

In the Pacific war, where air-to-air bombing was a frequent Japanese tactic, the bomber tactics of the USAAF attacking Japan with the new B29 also underwent a number of radical changes. At first the air commanders used the tried and tested tactics of day precision bombing from high altitude, but this produced disappointing results, due partly to strong winds at such a height. So, in January 1945, Maj.-General LeMay was brought in with orders to mount area bombing raids with incendiaries. He achieved a startling success which, in the opinion of the US official air historians, marked him 'as one of the very greatest of operational air commanders of the war' He achieved it by adopting a daring tactic. His bombers, packed with incendiaries, began flying lower altitude sorties at night (around 1,830 m. or 6,000 ft.), and, to increase their speed and bomb load, he had all their armament stripped except the tail gun. This tactic was first used to raid Tokyo on the night of 9/10 March. It was a calculated gamble which paid off. These "Fire Raids" inflicted greater material damage on Japan than the two atomic bombs.

I.C.B. Dear Oxford Companion to World War II