The Valour and the Horror - Honk Kong
The Valour and The Horror
Table of Contents of Producers Reply
Synopsis
Savage Christmas is one of three television documentaries in the
series, The Valour and the
Horror, dedicated to the more than
one million Canadian men and women who saw active service in World
War Two, and particularly the 42,000 Canadians who died to help win
that war.
The story of the Hong Kong campaign deals with questionable
decisions by Canadian and British politicians, poor planning and
strategy by the British military leaders in the colony of Hong
Kong, and the savage brutality of the attacking Japanese force.
But, most importantly, it is a film about the fighting spirit,
courage and tenacity of the 1,975 young Canadian soldiers who, in
December 1941, found themselves in a no-win situation against all
of the odds that were stacked against them.
Those patriotic volunteers (most of them teenagers or in their
early 20's) in the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg
Grenadiers were sent to defend a colony that the British had
secretly decided (and the Canadian government should have known)
was indefensible. With no experience, poor training, and lacking
military vehicles and other support equipment, the Canadian force
was thrown into the fray, heavily outnumbered by a battle-hardened
fanatical Japanese army. From the very start, it was no
contest.
They were the first Canadians to shed blood in combat during World
War Two. Their blood has left a shameful stain on the hands of the
politicians who sent them there, the military brass that proved
inept, and the enemy that treated the survivors not as defeated
soldiers, but as POW slave labourers in Hong Kong and Japan.
Some 300 Canadians were killed during the 18-day battle. Almost as
many died of torture, beatings, starvation and disease in the POW
camps of Hong Kong and Japan over the next three and a half years.
Their 28-percent fatality rate was proportionately one of the
highest of the war.
And the toll continues. Of the 1418 men who came home in 1945, only
400 or so are alive today. Most of the survivors died at a
premature age (in their 50's and 60's) as a result of ailments
related to the disease and malnutrition they endured as prisoners
of war. In fact, no World War Two Canadian force has experienced a
higher rate of post-war veteran casualties than those who fought in
Hong Kong.
Roger Cyr, national Secretary-Treasurer of the
Hong Kong Veterans Association, recently stated: "We lost another
70 of our guys in the last year (1992) alone. For many of us the
battle of Hong Kong is a lingering death."1
Areas of Criticism
The response to the film, from the media, from
the public, and from Hong Kong veterans, was overwhelmingly
positive. Unlike the other two films in the series,
Savage Christmas was subject to very little criticism, from far fewer
sources.
Those few who criticize the film object to assertions that it makes
about:
1) The Canadian government's intentions and inadequacies in sending
troops to Hong Kong;
2) The lack of training of these troops;
3) An attempt by the Canadian government to suppress details of the
Hong Kong fiasco.
Prologue
As in the other films in the series,
Savage Christmas was the product of more than two years of exhaustive
research, upon which the producers based the statements, analyses
and conclusions presented in the film. The research involved
combing through documents in Canadian, Hong Kong and Japanese
libraries and archives, reviewing what historians had written about
the battle, collecting unpublished letters, diaries and oral
histories of the soldiers who fought, and interviewing (both on and
off camera) dozens of Canadian, Japanese and British veterans of
the campaign. From this came a 104-minute documentary, written and
presented primarily from a Canadian perspective.
Clearly, in telling the Hong Kong story,
Savage Christmas has a specific focus and a point of view. The film's thesis
comes directly from No Reason
Why, written by Canadian historian
and archivist Carl Vincent. Mr. Vincent's book is regarded by both
Hong Kong veterans, and the academic community in Canada as the
standard reference work on the topic.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Vincent, Canada's top scholar on the
subject, has sent the producers an assessment of the film, in which
he states:
The Valour and the Horror while certainly a dramatic portrayal, in no
way alters or exaggerates [the] main facts.2
As we shall see, the basis for the film's assertions are well documented, both in Carl Vincent's book, and in other literature.
The critics of Savage Christmas question
the film's characterization of government actions in sending
Canadian troops to Hong Kong. Specifically, they object to the
narrative assertion that "Canada answered England's call, accepting
the mother country's assurance that they would not be in harm's
way."3
There is significant historical evidence
supporting this claim. The sequence of events that led up to the
dispatch of Canadians to Hong Kong is described by Vincent
in No Reason Why
(pp. 28 - 34). He outlines the following key
points:4
1. The British High Command considered that war in Hong Kong was inevitable, and imminent;
2. Hong Kong, they felt, could not be held;
3. No more British troops should be committed to this outpost;
4. Following a strong lobby from General A.E. Grasett, G.O.C. British Troops in China, and in light of the possible availability of Canadian troops, a request for one or two Canadian battalions was sent to the Canadian government. The request stressed that a changed position in the Far East fully justified a small re-inforcement of the garrison of Hong Kong; ;
5. The Cabinet War Committee chose to make a decision based only on the British telegram, and the military opinion of Chief of the Canadian General Staff, Major General H.D.G. Crerar;
6. The Honourable J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, had some doubts on the matter of military feasibility, but ultimately accepted Crerar's assessment that he saw "no military risk in despatching Canadian Battalions" to Hong Kong , and that Crerar had "definitely recommended that the Canadian Army should take this on." (Vincent's source for these quotes is the Duff Royal Commission Report; National Archives File: RG 33/120);
7. Crerar could have made an independent
assessment of the Hong Kong situation, but failed to do so. In
Vincent's words, "...the Canadian government did have enough information
at their disposal to form their own opinions on the matter. Hong
Kong defence schemes, intelligence reports, Japanese diplomatic
intelligence, and similar relevant material were all in Canadian
hands, and a brief glance at the first two in particular would have
(or should have) given them pause."5
The British request for
Canadian battalions for garrison duty carried with it an
implication that the men would be in no immediate danger. The sad
tragedy was that the Canadian politicians acceded so readily and
thoughtlessly, and that their military expert failed totally to do
any independent assessment. Indeed, such an assessment would not
have been difficult. As Vincent writes, "It is quite obvious that
there was very little information regarding the Japanese menace in
general and the defence of Hong Kong in particular that was not
available to the Canadian government or its senior military
officers at the time the decision was being taken to send Canadian
troops to Hong Kong. Japan was expanding aggressively, and the
practically defenceless colony of Hong Kong was in its path. Yet,
with this knowledge readily available, the decision was still made
to reinforce Hong Kong with Canadian troops. The only real question
after all is said and done is - why?"6
We turn now to the question of the inadequate
training of the Canadian contingent. Relevant information can again
be found in No Reason Why
(pp.44-78). Once again, most of Vincent's
information is drawn directly from submissions made to the 1942
Duff Commission. For example, Vincent refers to a Sept. 1941 status
report on the Royal Rifles' training (filed as Exhibit 122 in the
Duff Report). The TOET's (Tests of Elementary Training) show that
on the use of the rifle, the Royal Rifles were at "79% of
strength," and on the use of the Light Machine Gun (LMG) or Bren,
they were at "63% of strength."7
As Vincent points out, "the TOET's did not mean
that the soldier had necessarily even fired a weapon... but only
that he knew how to load, aim and clean it to a minimum degree." In
fact, the soldier "had to pass the test before he could be allowed
to fire" his weapon for the first time.8
Therefore, adds Vincent, "what these
percentages indicate if looked at negatively is that, of the two
main weapons, the rifle and Bren, 21% and 37% of the men had not
yet demonstrated that they were sufficiently trained to fire their
first shot!" Furthermore, "as the battalion was almost constantly
on the move from September until it arrived in Hong Kong in late
November, little more training could be
done."9
Further evidence can be found in a report by
Major-General C.M. Maltby, released in 1948, in which he says:
"These two [Canadian] battalions proved to be inadequately trained
for modern war under the conditions existing in Hong
Kong."10
Several interviews carried out by the film's
Associate Producer and Researcher, D'Arcy O'Connor, also uncovered
telling facts. For example, in an interview with Kay Christie, the
Canadian nursing sister depicted in the film, of September 20,
1989, she says: "They [the Canadian soldiers] were not trained.
Outside our cabin on the Awatea [the ship
transporting the Canadians to Hong Kong], they used to be giving
them lectures, telling them what the size of the flannel to clean
their rifle - it was 4 by 7, it was not 4 and a half by 6. And I
thought, 'Good heavens, right back to scratch they're teaching
them.' What this was called, what this end of the rifle was called,
.... I was just appalled, I really was. That men on their way over
would have to be taught this. Honest to goodness. I was just
appalled. But they weren't sent over to fight, they were going over
for garrison duty, just to strengthen the British...But then, when
you look at these British troops that were there, some had been
over for two and three, and into their fourth year, and were
waiting to be returned to Britain. Okay, they should have known how
to fight, but they didn't."11
Also of note is a September 23, 1989 interview with veteran Walter Jenkins in which he says: "I never even fired my goddamn rifle. You know what happened, eh? This George Verreaux and I went to battle group. I had to sign a paper to get some bullets for my rifle. I don't know what the guy thought I was going to do with them. I had to sign for them! British you know, very methodical. I said to Blackie, 'How do I load this fucker?' The only thing I'd ever fired was a .22, as a kid shooting rabbits. And he says, 'Holy shit!' So he showed me how to put the clip in... I couldn't even do it now, but that was the only lesson I had... He showed me how to put the clip in, or whatever they had. So he says, 'Christ, if you put that in like that,' I was starting to put it in, he said, 'you would jam it.' Lucky I didn't have to fire it because I didn't know fuck-all about killing people. Never. All I ever did in [training] camp was drive a truck. And put in telephone lines. I didn't know anything about being a soldier."12
Early in the film, the narrator says that the
"details of what happened to the soldiers were for a long time
suppressed by the Canadian government,"13a line that has met with
some criticism. Some critics argue, for example, that a Royal
Commission looked into these events in 1942 and that its report was
made public and covered by the press at the time. Others maintain
that a "cover-up" could not have occurred because all of the
relevant documentation is presently in archives, readily available
to all.
The Duff Commission of 1942 was held
in camera, a
reasonable procedure in wartime. Its report, however, was regarded
by the opposition parties at the time (and by writers since then)
as incomplete and little more than a Liberal Government whitewash.
As Tommy Douglas of the CCF said at the time: "I had expected the
Report to be a whitewash, but I hardly expected the Report to read
like the brief for the Government Counsel."14Apart from stories of
the treatment of the POWs which came out on their return home in
1945, details of the government's involvement in sending the
unprepared force to Hong Kong continued to be withheld from the
public. In 1948, a second inquiry was held, by the Chief of the
General Staff, General Charles Foulkes. Its results were also
confidential.
Not until the 1950's and 1960's, when public interest in the war had waned, did the full and true story emerge (as a result of various hearings before the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs looking into the compensation issue for Hong Kong veterans). The reality, then, is that details of the Canadian involvement in Hong Kong were indeed suppressed until long after such suppression was necessary for the security and/or morale of the Canadian troops. This is the claim that the film makes, a claim that is clearly backed by significant documentation.
In sum, it is quite ironic that the central thesis of the Hong Kong documentary must even be defended against the sort of criticisms discussed above. Indeed, for an historical evaluation that bears out its central thesis, one need go no further than the Canadian Encyclopedia. Brereton Greenhous, a senior historian at the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence, writes:
In 1940 the British regarded their crown colony
of Hong Kong and its 20,000-man garrison as expendable in the event
of war with Japan and decided against reinforcing it. But in
September 1941 the Canadian government agreed to send the Royal
Rifles of Canada (a Québec unit) and the Winnipeg
Grenadiers, although they were not considered fit for action. They
arrived on 16 November 1941 and 22 days later the Japanese attacked
the colony's New Territories on the mainland. On Dec. 18 the
Japanese crossed to the island of Hong Kong and on Christmas Day
the governor surrendered. Of 1,975 Canadians, 557 were killed or
died in prison camps. Political pressure at home forced the
Canadian government to appoint a royal commission to investigate
the circumstances of Canada's involvement. The sole commissioner,
Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff, misinterpreted or ignored evidence,
and exonerated the Cabinet, the Department of National Defence and
the senior members of the General Staff. In 1948 a confidential
analysis by General Charles Foulkes, chief of the general staff,
found many errors in Duff's assessment, but concluded that proper
training and equipment would have made little
difference.15
Thus we have substantiation from the senior Defence Department
historian concerning issues challenged by our critics.
The battle of Hong Kong was unnecessarily waged on unequal terms.
The obvious enemy was the Imperial Japanese Army. But the 2,000
Canadian men who desperately fought to defend the colony were also
thwarted by the mistakes of their leaders. In any war, there is an
appropriate time, place and way to fight. Yet there is also a time,
place and a way not to fight. Such decisions are made by
politicians and generals. If they are wrong, the results can be
catastrophic. They quite obviously were wrong in Hong Kong, and the
cost of that mistake is still being paid by the dwindling numbers
of survivors of the campaign.
The nature of the tragic debacle that was the battle of Hong Kong is perfectly enunciated by the title of Carl Vincent's book, No Reason Why. Savage Christmas: Hong Kong 1941, which Vincent calls "a very good film,"16also examines why those courageous young men were sent halfway around the world to die pointlessly in the defense of their country. And, like Vincent, the film could find no good reason why.
1. Roger Cyr: Conversation with D'Arcy O'Connor; June 16,
1992.
2. Carl Vincent: Letter to the producers; June 17, 1992.
3. Savage
ChristmasPost-Production Script;
p.5.
4. Carl Vincent, No Reason Why(Stittsville, Ontario: Canada's Wings Inc., 1981), pp.28-34.
5. Ibid., p.32.
6. Vincent, No
Reason Why, p.23.
7. Ibid.,p.63.
8. Ibid.,p.63.
9. Ibid.,p.63.
10. Report is in Supplement to the London Gazette, Jan. 29, 1948,
p.701; D-Hist File No. 593.D40.
11. Kay Christie: Interview with D'Arcy O'Connor, September 20,
1989.
12. Walter Jenkins: Interview with D'Arcy O'Connor, September 23,
1989.
13. Savage
ChristmasPost-Production Script;
p.4.
14. Vincent, No
Reason Why, p.225.
15. Canadian Encyclopedia (2nd Ed.), Vol. 2, 1985. p.1005.
16. Carl Vincent: Conversation with the producers at Savage Christmas screening, NFB; December 3, 1991.
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Table of Contents of Producers Reply
