Controversy : The Valour and the Horror

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The Valour and the Horror - Normandy

The Valour and The Horror

Introduction

Synopsis

In Desperate Battle: Normandy 1944 is the third and final episode in the series, The Valour and the Horror. It describes the start of the 1st Canadian Army's campaign in Normandy in the early summer months of 1944. For most of the Canadian fighting men involved, this was to be their first encounter with actual battle in the Second World War.

Who were these men going into battle for the very first time? Were they prepared for the fighting they were about to face?

All indications are that they were not. Plagued by a lack of training, an inferiority of equipment, and a weakness in senior leadership, the Army would suffer several setbacks in the first two months of the campaign.

Yet, despite these adversities, the Canadian fighting man would display exceptional courage, and a remarkable ability to persevere in the face of horror.

In Desperate Battle examines the first two months of the campaign in Normandy, following two distinct threads. The first is the story of two Canadian veterans, Generals Jacques Dextraze and Radley Walters, chosen to represent the Canadian fighting man. At all times, the film attempts to treat this story with the sensitivity and respect that it warrants.

Areas of Criticism

The second thread is the story of the battle for Normandy circa 7 June to 25 July, 1944. Here, the film takes an analytical look at the battle, and in the process develops certain controversial themes, as follows:

1. The question of the Canadian Army's preparedness for war: training and equipment;

2. The question of competence in the senior leadership of the Canadian Army;

3. The Kurt Meyer counterattack of 7 June and Operation Spring (25 July);

4. The shooting of prisoners of war;

5. The destruction of Caen.

A Review of the Historical Background to the Valour and Horror Series film ofthe Normandy Campaign in 1944: In Desperate Battle

There has been too much glorification of the campaign and too little objective investigation

B.H. Liddel Hart

Lessons of Normandy

Prologue

This paper reviews the historical evidence for the central theme of In Desperate Battle; it does not pretend to account for every statement, statistic or conclusion presented in the film.

In Desperate Battle examines the 1st Canadian Army's preparedness for the campaign in Normandy in the summer of 1944. Specifically, the film reviews the training, equipment and senior leadership of the Canadian Army during the first two months.

It develops as its main themean observation found in Col. C.P. Stacey's third volume of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. After thoroughly chronicling the Campaign in Normandy, the Canadian Army's Official Historian included a remarkably candid and forthright evaluation of Army's performance and readiness for battle:

When we went into battle at Falaise and Caen we found that when we bumped into battle-experienced German troops we were no match for them.

Maj.-Gen. C Foulkes

2 Canadian Infantry Division

The match: Battle Experienced German Troops

It must be recognized that the enemy divisions facing the Canadians were a mixed lot. Some, like the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Panzer Division were battle tested elite divisions. However, the majority of the German formations facing the Canadians were as inexperienced as Crerar's Army.

The 12th SS "Hitler Jugend" Panzer Division, long considered our nemesis, was raised in June 1943 and fought its first battle against the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division on June 7th, 1944, less than 10 months after it began field training. The Hitler Jugend did possess one important advantage: experienced leaders. The officers and non commissioned officers of the Divisions were selected throughout the SS, mainly from the "parent" unit - the 1st SS Leibstandarte. They all were veterans of at least one campaign on the Russian front; some, like Kurt Meyer had fought several European campaigns.

Leadership by battle trained leaders was to prove decisive. Within weeks of combat, the newly raised division, composed of teenagers and led by veterans, was considered an elite unit by the Allies.

The 272 Infantry Division, which defended Verrières Ridge, was considered a second class unit. Recently raised, it was undergoing training in southern France on D-Day. It had no previous training in the Calvados.

The reported ascendancy of German Divisions over Canadian was disturbing and considered important enough to examine, particularly when it is appreciated that the Canadian Army had been in England for four years training for battle.

Further, Canadian headquarters in London made a point of transferring many "battle experienced" officers from the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy to lead the units preparing to invade France. Foulkes, Kitching, and Booth and are some examples. Guy Simonds is perhaps the best known.

Preparing for War

Canada had done little to build on the high standards of professional skills acquired in the Great War in order to prepare for the next. After 1918 the Canadian Government had reduced a vaunted force to a handful of battalions. By June 1931 the Permanent Force's strength was less than four thousand.

As for the tiny regular army, the Permanent Active Militia, its peace establishment was 6925 all ranks, but its actual strength on 31 March 1931 was only 3688....

The Permanent Force ...had risen only to 4261 all ranks at 31 July 1939....The Non Permanent Active Militia had not increased in strength...On 31 December 1938 the number enrolled was 51,418.

C.P. Stacey

The leap from an ill equipped permanent militia to a half million man army created serious problems for the Canadian military. The army required complete organizations, a practiced doctrine and trained officers to manage an army of two corps and the staffs to run the headquarters. The Canadian Governments of the twenties and thirties could have established a foundation for mobilizing a large army but committed to post war recovery or burdened by the economic woes of the depression, they chose not to.

Canadians were still using Cavalry charges to end summer war games. In a 1935 secret memo to the government McNaughton wrote:

(1) There is not a single modern anti-aircraft gun of any sort in Canada.

(2) The stocks of field gun ammunition on hand represent 90 minutes' fire at normal rates for the field guns inherited from the Great War and which are now obsolescent

(3) The coast defence armament is obsolescent....we have not dared for some years to indulge in any practice firing

(4) About the only article of which stocks are held is [horse] harness, and this is practically useless...

(5) There are only 25 aircraft of service type in Canada, all of which are obsolescent. Not a single machine is of a type fit to employ in active operations.

(6) Not one service air bomb is held in Canada.

In 1936, after Hitler had defied Versailles and the prospects of a war in Europe appeared reasonable, MacKenzie King's newly elected government re-organized Canada's land forces to include 14 Cavalry Regiments. Four militia cavalry units were converted into armoured car regiments and six militia infantry units were redesignated as "tank battalions". However, there wereno armoured cars or tanksavailable for training. Militia units had to rent civilian motor cars to represent scout vehicles. In 1939 the entire Canadian mechanized force comprised of 12 bren gun carriers, one artillery tractor and two British light tanks.

The expertise gained in the trenches of Picardy was fritted away. The army grew quickly, perhaps too quickly. Despite careful training in England it was not really ready to fight as complete divisions, let alone a field force of two corps. The subsequent battle results were what would be expected of an army and its officers who were learning their craft.

..it seems reasonable to suggest as well that first hand experience of combat was particularly important in the development of an army whose officer corps had so few opportunities to practice real soldiering in peacetime. Although it affected all ranks, the lack of such experience was felt most keenly among those promoted beyond their level of competence to command brigades, divisions, and corps early in the war because no one better was available.

Stephen J. Harris

Canadian Brass

The sign posts left by Stacey and recent Canadian military historians influenced In Desperate Battle to investigate the Normandy Campaign, report what had occurred, and to suggest whyit had occurred.

The Canadian Army's Preparedness For War

Training

Man for man and unit for unit, it cannot be said that is was by tactical superiority that we won the Battle of Normandy.

C.P. Stacey

The In Desperate Battle contention that "The men often weren't required to take it (their training) seriously" is consistent with Stacey as well as deductions made by recent Canadian military historians. It was clear that the Canadian fighting man was the equal of any:

The soldiery in the Canadian Corps are probably the best material in any armies of the Empire.

Field Marshal Montgomery

There were, however, notable gaps in the officers' ability at Regimental level and above. Certainly there is considerable evidence to suggest that both the two divisional commanders as well as General Simonds had serious difficulties during the operations before and during the assaults against Verrières Ridge.

The 2nd Canadian Corps had nearly four years to train and equip an army for combat against an enemy whose equipment, doctrine and tactics were well known.

The real trouble was that officers generally had never been taught 'training' as distinct from fighting in battle...[they did]...not really understand it...much time was wasted and many men bored....much energy was wasted by wrong methods.

Field Marshal Montgomery

The troops were ready and generally well trained - at least, as well trained as the methods in use in the Canadian and British armies could make them. But too much training had bred a make-believe mood. As reluctant amateurs, many Canadians had found it hard to take "exercises" seriously. In the days to come, that would hurt.

J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton

General B.M.L. Montgomery returned to England in 1 January 44, six months before D-Day, appointed as ground commander of the Allied invasion forces. His evaluation of the state training of Canadian troops was immediately critical. The "Montgomery Reforms" wrought considerable changes in the command structure of the divisions in England. Crerar had already replaced McNaughton and Simonds was brought back from Italy to take over 2nd Corps. Dozens of generals, staff officers and battalion commanders were replaced because of incompetence or age.

Yet despite the best efforts of Montgomery and Crerar, Canada's official history states the following in the concluding chapter to the Normandy Campaign:

The Canadian Army suffered from possessing a proportion of regimental officers whose attitude towards training was casual and haphazard rather than urgent and scientific.

...one suspects the Germans contrived to get more out of their training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual than ours.

Colonel Stacey takes time to include a German evaluation directly into his concluding chapter where he notes the enemy had "no very lofty opinion of the Allied foot soldier":

The morale of the enemy is not very high. It depends largely on artillery and air support. In case of a well placed concentration of fire from our own artillery the infantry will often leave its positions and retreat hastily. Whenever enemy is engaged with force, he usually retreats or surrenders.

German Intelligence Summary

Quoted by Stacey

There is evidence that, even after years of Battle Drill training in the United Kingdom, the Canadian Infantry had to pause for re-evaluation. Training that appeared sufficient during 1940-43 was examined after the 1st Cdn Division had a taste of battle in Sicily and Italy. The Infantry Training Conference held in April 44 passed resolutions noting that the Manual of Fieldcraft and Battle Drill was not up to date because: "The writers had no battle experience." Battle Drill itself was found:

too rigid...hard and fast rules may tend to make Pl comds [Platoon Commanders] think that every situation calls for one of only three operations, i.e. right flanking, left flanking or pincer movement...counter attacks in which Pl Comds are generally weak, is not sufficiently covered.

Review of troops' performance in Normandy further suggested that the training given the Canadian soldier had not totally succeeded in allowing him to master the basics:

The average soldier is not as skilled in the use of his personal weapons as the German or American soldier.

21 Army Group Letter, July 1943

Colonel Stacey's evaluation of the Canadian Army's performance in Normandy noted :

...the Canadian regimental officer at his best ....had no superior. There still remained, however, that proportion of officers who were not fully competent for their appointments, and whose inadequacy appeared in action and sometimes had serious consequences.

Perhaps it should be considered that In Desperate Battle is no more critical of Canadian leadership than the official history. It certainly goes no further than recent histories by respected Canadian military historians.

The sad realization that General McNaughton's description of the Canadian Army as a "Dagger pointed at the Heart of Berlin" - had become a source of ridicule by 1944. The Canadians had been in England since 1939; except for the tragedy at Dieppe, the only battle experience gained was by the 1st Canadian Corps which had invaded Sicily in July 1943. In comparison, the American Army, which had entered the war in December 1941 and arrived in England in 1942, had already participated in two European Campaigns: the invasion of North Africa and Sicily.

It would seem that Stacey's summation, and the film's contention, is correct:

They did well, but they would certainly have done better had they not been learning the business as they fought.

The Canadian Army's Preparedness For War

Equipment

The Allied superiority in the air and in materiel is well known. What is not often appreciated is the tactical disadvantage vis à vis armour and basic infantry weapons. By 1944 the tank was the principal weapon on the battlefield. Armour was the arm of decision.

The Armour

The Canadian Armoured Corps entered the Normandy Campaign with a main battle tank that was already considered obsolete by the Germans. There were serious faults with the American Sherman M4A2 and A4 (redesignated Shermans III and V by the British). Its 75mm gun could not penetrate German tanks (particularly the Tigerand Panther) except at close range.

Conversely, the German guns were capable of destroying Canadian tanks long range - well before our tank guns became effective. The Sherman models that equipped Canadian armoured units were simply inferior to and not capable of dealing with the Panther and Tigerunits at anything even approaching equal terms.

The shock and effectiveness of German tanks is curious since Tigers and Panthers were well documented by Russian and Allied liaison officers as early as 1942. Models of the Tiger were captured and fully evaluated by Allied troops in North Africa in February 1943. As early as July 1942:

an order was placed for 200 Shermans - the much sought after Firefly of 1944, -to be so equipped (17 pdr main gun - capable of engaging Tigers). What happened is unclear; the only certainty is that the order was never carried out....big German tanks could slaughter any British or American one from a safe distance and that nothing useful was being done to redress the balance.

Despite the productive ascendancy of the Allied war machine, it did not produce a first rate tank during the war. The greatest industrial / military power in the world; in seven years of war, was not capable of matching German engineering. The British, despite a considerable technical head start and extensive experience, could not design a decent main battle tank. In fact, the entire British economy was consistently bested by German production throughout the war - even during the Allied bombing offensive.

Canadian factories built the ineffective Ram and Valentine tanks. The Ram was replaced by the Sherman before Normandy and the Valentine was so inferior that it was sent directly from Montreal to the USSR as lend lease. Canadian armoured units were engaged by German armour in Sicily and southern Italy from July to December 1943 and throughout 1944.

Given the large amount of accurate intelligence available, it is particularly disturbing to realize that the only weapons capable of dealing with German tanks at acceptable battle range were the 17 pounder antitank gun and the Sherman VC "Firefly" (also mounting the 17 pdr). Despite the probability of a disadvantaged battle, Sherman "Fireflys" were only available in minute proportions (one per troop). The psychological and physical effects on the Canadian armoured Corps are well documented.

Post Blitzkrieg Armoured Tactics

The Canadian Armoured Corps' training in England was confined and not fully prepared for the challenge of Norman geography. Realistic training was impossible, cross country movement was: "restricted to rds [roads] and edges of any fds [fields] under plough." In addition, the tactics themselves were based on North African experience and totally impractical for Normandy. The British-Canadian emphasis on the "The Pivot" doctrine was better suited for Libya than Calvados:

The chief points on which the inf should be trained operationally are:

(a) Fmn of a pivot of manoeuvre for the armour.....a fortress around which the armour may fight.

Creative Tactics

Dated tactics and a marked superiority by German armour gave rise to a certain desperation. That desperation gave birth to creative tactics and creative engineering.

Canadians discovered Panthers could be killed but it required stealth, an unerring eye and courage. The solution was to place a shot just under the panther's gun mantlet ( a "six inch bulls eye") so it would deflect downward :

The round cannot bounce off, it must bounce down. And what does it do? It smashes this weak armour here over the driver and the co-driver and in most cases, we found out that they're either badly wounded or killed, and the tank is automatically knocked out.

General S.V. Radley Walters

Radley Walters' calm description disguises the tremendous psychological pressure put on the crews that hunted German tanks:

"It [the Allied tank] creeps up on it. When it reaches close quarters the gunner tries to bounce a shot off the underside of the Panther's gun mantlet. If he's lucky, it goes through a piece of thin armour above the driver's head."

"Has anybody ever done it?"

"Yes. Davis in C Squadron. He's back with headquarters now, trying to recover his nerve."

"How does a Churchill [tank] get a Tiger?"

"Its supposed to get within two hundred yards and put a shot through the periscope."

"Has anyone ever done it?"

"No."

Max Hastings

Overlord

Creative Armour

Canadian tank crews were forced to invent their own armour protection directly in the Normandy battlefield. General Radley Walters, then a squadron commander, welded discarded German tank tracks to the hull of his tank to protect his crew from armour piercing shot. But even with jerryrigged "appliqué" armour the Sherman could not withstand direct fire from enemy tanks:

Just outside Carpiquet I saw a single shot from a Panther knock out three Shermans. It went through two of them before stopping in the third.

The bottom line was that despite the skill and bravery of individual crews, most Canadian tanks were brewed up (hit and set alight) directly they exposed themselves to German anti tank guns and Panzers. The tactical result is that when Canadians attacked in Normandy, armour did not lead. In the attack, Canadian Infantry was sent in alone, behind a creeping artillery barrage.

The battles of Verrières Ridge directly reflect this situation: the North Nova Scotia Regiment attacked Tilly with no tank support. When a squadron of Shermans was finally made available, it gallantly charged forward only to be shot to pieces by German tanks.

The Calgaries attacked May sur Orne with no armour. The Black Watch was allotted a single squadron (19 tanks from B Squadron, 1st Hussars) to support its attack against a dug in division . When the Black Watch did advance, the Hussars raced forward and reached May, only to be checked by Panthers.

The Odds Against Us

It is accepted by all armies that the minimum acceptable attack ratio must be 3 to 1 in infantry and 5 to 1 in all arms. The Canadian infantry rarely enjoyed this luxury. The Allies didhave important advantages over the Germans: artillery; air superiority and a vast amount of materiel. The Allies could afford to lose equipment - it was immediately replaced. The Canadian Army could afford to lose everything but men. In the end, it was men that the Army lost most of.

The Canadian Armoured Corps found itself in dire straits. During the bulk of the fighting in Normandy (June - July 44), the two Canadian divisions were supported by the only armoured formation available to them: the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.

The 2nd CAB had three armoured regiments and each Regiment had about 70 tanks. It was these regiments that were constantly engaged against tanks from two to four German Panzer Divisions.

The average German Panzer (armoured) division had about 150 tanks. Even recognizing that Canadian losses were "topped up" and the German replacements were reduced to a trickle by Allied air power, the combat ratio was often in the Germans' favour.

The Infantry

Despite the advent of Blitzkrieg, in the summer of 1944, in the Canadian Army, the Infantry was still considered the Queen of Battle. Armour may have been the arm of decision but, supported by indirect fire (artillery and mortars) infantry was the only arm that could seize and hold ground. Even if the Pivot concept was unsuited to Normandy - it was the infantry that provided a secure base for the attack. Given the reluctance of commanders to send the tanks forward, the infantry also led the attacks.

The result was that the infantry battalions took the bulk of the casualties in the Normandy Campaign. While the artillery accepted 7%; and the armoured Corps casualties were officially reported as 15 - 20%; the infantry suffered over 65% of the combat casualties in Normandy.

Weapons

The basic infantry weapon is the rifle, but it is the machine gun that controls ground and it is the machine gun that shatters infantry attacks. The German army had superb submachine guns, there simply is no fair comparison of the "Schmeisser" to the crude "Sten Gun". German platoons also boasted a better "medium" machine gun - the MG 42 was vastly superior to the Bren Gen or even the 303 Vickers. The Germans also had technologically superior mortars and small arms ammunition.

The infantry can protect itself against enemy armour in two ways: its own supporting tanks or available anti-tank weapons found in the infantry battalion. German infantry could rely on the legendary "88" anti tank gun to destroy armour at longrange, in addition, the German soldier was capable of defeating Allied tanks in theclose assault with superb hand held anti-armour weapons: the panzerfaust and the panzershreck. Canadian troops had nothing comparable.

The film chronicled the conditions in which Canadian infantry and armoured troops fought and accurately reported the inferiority of Canadian equipment to German.

The Leadership of the Canadian Army

Canadian military leadership during World War II was an interesting combination of feuding personalities and developing, perhaps questionable, ability. Their actions at times suggested a preferred loyalty to Montgomery rather than their Canadian senior commanders.

In mid July 1943, as the first true operational campaign with a Canadian Division began in Sicily, Lt. General Simonds requested that Montgomery prevent General McNaughton from visiting him in the field. This led to the unfortunate and infamous "arrest order" which threatened the Commander of the Canadian Forces in Europe if he so much as land in Italy. Throughout the Italy and Normandy campaigns Simonds seems to have found a friendlier ear in Monty's Headquarters than in General H.D.G. Crerar's.

The Canadian High Command in Normandy can not be described as a happy ship. Rivalries and jealousies were present, Canadian generals' professional competence was questioned by both British and Canadian Commanders in Chief.

The suitability of Crerar and his relationship with Simonds

Canadian generals' relationships may have been motivated by competition or jealousy. Commander of 1st Canadian Army, General H.D.G. Crerar had quarreled with Simonds earlier and consistently tried to block his promotion. Canadian Military Historian John A. English writes:

Indeed it is highly unlikely that professional ability alone would have saved him [Simonds] from the malevolence of Crerar who increasingly envied the rising fortune of his once quite junior subordinate. The depth and rancour was most balefully demonstrated in Italy...

Crerar's doubts about Simonds continued in Normandy. He wrote to advise Montgomery that he had "serious cause to doubt...(the) suitability (of Simonds) for higher command." and was still concerned about his ability to control Simonds. Crerar feared that the Commander of 2nd Corps "resent...any control or direction on...(his) part."

General Crerar's personal dispute with Simonds extended to doubts about his ability as a field commander. He suggested that Simonds'

nerves [were] over-stretched and that impulse, rather than considered judgement, [might]...begin to affect his decisions...extremely worried...[Simonds was] reaching a position in the Army when balance ... [was] becoming even more important to... [his] future than brilliance.

Even more astounding is the fact that General Crerar requested Simonds to "undertake a self examination, and...diagnosis of...[his] mental and physical condition."

General Crerar was to have difficulties with British as well Canadian subordinates. Montgomery wrote the following opinion:

Harry Crerar has started off his career as an Army Comd. by thoroughly upsetting everyone...he had a row with Crocker the first day and asked me to remove Crocker. I have spent two days trying to restore peace...As always there are faults on both sides, but the basic cause was Harry; I fear he thinks he is a great soldier...I now hope I can get on with fighting the Germans -- instead of stopping the generals fighting amongst themselves. The more I think of Harry Crerar, the more I am convinced that he is quite unfit to command an army in the field at present. He has much to learn and he will have many shocks before he has learnt it properly. He has already started to have rows with Canadian generals under me.

Corps Commander : Lt.-General G.G. Simonds

General Simonds' career has been carefully studied and his reputation as a respected soldier and tactical innovator is noted.

General Crerar held serious reservations regarding Simonds. The GOC 8th Army, General Montgomery, and a Simonds supporter, also recorded a critical evaluation. Simonds commanded the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (a part of 8th Army) in Italy, during July - October 1943. Monty was not pleased when his Canadian Division Commander fired Brigadier Howard Graham, commander of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade. Montgomery wrote to Corps Commander Oliver Leese:

This is a great pity. Graham is an excellent fellow and much beloved in his brigade. I expect Simonds (sic) lost his temper. Simonds is a young and very inexperienced divisional general and has much to learn about command.

...highest opinion of Simonds...[although he] tried to go off the rails once or twice when he first went into action with his Div...

Simonds must therefore be handled carefully and trained on.

Montgomery was ruthless and unforgiving of officers he did not like. Montgomery was forgiving of Simonds. He considered him one of his protégés. Whether this was because of Simonds social background or his military potential can be debated. He did not have the same regard for Crerar or Keller.

Review of Crerar's correspondence regarding Simonds; and Montgomery's correspondence about the both of themraises the question: were Crerar or Simonds ready to command the Canadian Divisions in Normandy? Should a more experienced British officer have been given the command?

Montgomery noted:

From what I hear I believe the Canadians would gladly accept a British general whom they know and trust than have the troops mishandled by an inexperienced general of their own. Dempsey has served with them and they all know and like him. As soon as they can produce their own general then he takes over at once. Until that time, give the Canadian army to Dempsey.

Montgomery was clearly referring to Crerar but all the Canadian Generals appear to have had a rough time in Normandy. Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew observed:

The evidence suggests that these lessons learned in the first weeks of the Normandy campaign were not understood by Simonds or Major-General Foulkes, who commanded the 2nd Canadian Division. This ignorance had a profound effect on the fortunes of the division in its first weeks in battle.

Montgomery's observations and Canadian historical evaluations reinforced the query: were Canadian generals including, perhaps, Simonds up to the task? Questioning a battlefield commander's competence by those who have not shared their experience is always risky. A review of Keller's and Foulkes' performance suggests this is not an unfair question.

The Competence of Maj. General R.F.L. Keller

Although he was considered competent initially, by May 1944 senior generals' feelings about Keller were mixed. General Crerar thought "Keller would make a two fisted and competent Corps Comd in the field". Ken Stuart, the Chief of Staff did not share that opinion. He submitted the following evaluation to the Minister of National Defence:

Maj. Gen. R.F.L. Keller (Permanent Force) C.O.C. 3rd Cdn. Div.

Pompous, inconsiderate of others. Anything but brilliant and much over-rated. Consider that he has not the ability to command a Brigade in the field much less a Division.

As the stalemate in Normandy continued through June, Maj.-General's Keller's British Commanders began to notice distinct problems ("...the Div. became jumpy and excitable") in 3rd Canadian Division which they soon attributed to Keller. A high level of "Battle Exhaustion" (whose medical interpretations emphasize battlefield conditions and general morale) occurred in both Canadian Divisions in Normandy. It rose sharply in Keller's Division after the initial bridgehead battles had subsided.

average of one in every four infantry casualties [the vast majority of Normandy casualties were in the infantry] were due to battle exhaustion....The Canadian battle exhaustion problem was fairly typical of the overall Allied experience in Normandy. NP ratios of 35 were not uncommon in battalions exposed to exceptionally adverse battle conditions.

Copp and McAndrew

By 5 July both the Corps Commander, Lt General John Crocker and Commander 2nd British Army, Lt. General Miles Dempsey wrote to Field marshal Montgomery stating that Keller's Division was not performing well and particularly demanding that Maj. General Keller be removed from command of 3rd Cdn Division. According to Crocker, the 3rd Canadian Division had "lapsed into a very nervy state...became jumpy...general attitude of despondency"

The question of Maj.-General Keller's fitness to command became more serious when the question of alcohol was raised. In England, on 3 May 1943 Crerar admonished Keller for "misbehaviour in the matter of over-indulgence". Keller's drinking had been the subject of complaint by British and Canadian senior officers.

Keller, who was an excellent Commander, drank too much and made an objectionable fool of himself on social occasions.

After the failure of his division to capture Carpiquet Airport on 4th July, Keller was the subject of a stern report by Lt.-General J.T. Crocker who advised the GOC in C Second British Army, Lt.-General M.C. Dempsey (at this date Keller's 3rd Division was part of 2nd British Army and answerable directly to Dempsey) that Keller was:

not really fit temperamentally and perhaps physically (he is a man who has the appearance of having lived pretty well) for such a responsible command.

Crocker had observed earlier that 3rd Division's "very nervy state" was a:

reflection of the state of its commander...obviously not standing up to the strain and showed signs of fatigue and nervousness (one might almost sayfright) which were patent for all to see.

Montgomery agreed. He wrote to Crerar that Keller was "... not good enough to command a Canadian division." and wrote to Field Marshal Alan Brooke :

Keller has not proved himself to be quite fit to command a division; he is unable to get the best out of his soldiers who are grand chaps.

Despite his earlier warning to Keller, General Crerar decided to ignore the adverse reports from Crocker, Dempsey and Montgomery and not remove him from command. General Simonds concurred. Whether or not alcohol was a serious problem for Keller or impaired his judgement during the Normandy Campaign, the one clear thing that emerges is he had "lost it". His nerves ("...one might almost say fright..") infected his command. Keller did not have the intellectual qualities required of a divisional commander or, as Simonds noted:

Appreciated the vital importance of the moral aspects of higher command and the absolute necessity for the commander being a stabilizing influence...I believe Major General Keller has failed to do his best...

However, Lt.-General Simonds decided that removal of Keller would have a greater adverse effect on 3rd Division than leaving him in charge:

The division (Keller's 3rd) has had some 5,500 casualties since 'D' Day...I am quite certain that a change of Senior commanders at the present time would have a most adverse effect on its morale....I am NOT prepared to recommend his removal on the evidence at present available to me.

Maj. General C. Foulkes

Simonds mistrusted and detested Foulkes (Commander, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division) but then we all detested Foulkes...

Brigadier H. W. Foster

The Division that lost most heavily in Spring (and Operation Atlantic) was Maj.-Gen. C. Foulkes' 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. The Division had been bloodied in Dieppe, rebuilt (unlike 3rd Cdn Div, Foulkes rejected a neuro-psychiatric screening to identify potentially unstable soldiers) and thrown against Verrières Ridge in its first major battle, 19 July. General Foulkes' competence as a field commander was not established in his first two battles (Operations Atlantic and Spring) and his relationship with Simonds proved strained. Copp and McAndrew's evaluation of Foulkes bears repeating:

General Foulkes' relationship with his Brigadiers was cool. There was no "band of brothers" in 2nd Division. Foulkes' dealings with Commander of 5 Brigade, Brigadier W.J. Megill, were to prove tense.

Before Spring began, Foulkes removed one of Megill's battalions to Divisional reserve, its replacement were the Camerons, already decimated after Atlantic and a three day battle against the 1st SS and 9th SS Divisions for control of St André. They were tasked with securing Megill's start line for Spring.

After visiting the Camerons it was clear to Megill that they could not clear his Brigade's "Start Line" . His attempts to convince Foulkes met with rebuke. "Failure to secure the Start Line" (the area or line of departure from which an attack must begin - according to Doctrine; it must be secured and "safe" so that the attack may develop, maintain momentum, and not get bogged down just as it begins) was identified as one of the main causes for the failure of 2nd Division's attack (and the Black Watch's destruction) by General Simonds.

On the afternoon of the 25th, following the defeat of the Black Watch and the Calgary Highlanders, General Foulkes ordered Megill to prepare for further Brigade attacks the next day. Megill attempted to convince Foulkes to reconsider - this resulted in another argument.

An examination of the generalship that led the Canadian Army through the Normandy Campaign suggests that there is room for critical analysis and a duty to report the findings.

The Battles of June and July

JUNE 7th: Counterattack - Kurt Meyer vs Cunningham

In Desperate Battle begins with reference to the success of 3rd Division in storming the beaches on D-Day. It then examines the attempt by 9 Brigade to advance toward Caen and the subsequent counter attack by the 12 SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division on the 7th of June; "D plus 1".

This decisive battle, which was to determine the future of the campaign, was fought by Brigadier D.G. "Ben" Cunningham's "Highland Brigade". 9 Brigade left its start line on the morning of 7th June with every expectation that Carpiquet airport and even Caen would be in Canadian hands by the afternoon. The tragic end to this hope was the surprise counter-attack by the van guard of the 12th SS "Hitler Jugend" Panzer Division .

Kurt Meyer's Regiment also reached the area in early morning of the 7th. Supported by a panzer battalion, the Panzer Grenadier's attack swept through Authie, Gruchy, Franqueville and Buron, overrunning the lead companies of the North Nova Scotia Regiment. Cunningham's brigade was thrown back to Les Buissons. That is the drama of 7th June: the prize of Caen dashed from Canadian hands by Meyer's last minute counterattack.

The result was a sealed bridgehead and a month long stalemate.

July 25th: The Attack against Verrières Ridge

Operation Spring

The principle inspiration for telling the story of Verrières Ridge comes from C.P. Stacey:

...for this apparently insignificant eminence is Verrières Ridge. Well may the wheat and sugar-beet grow green and lush upon its gentle slopes, for in that now half-forgotten summer the best blood of Canada was freely poured out upon them.

Verrières Ridge is the last obstacle before the Caen-Falaise plain, perhaps the finest tank country in Normandy. There had been two previous attempts to capture Verrières, Operation Goodwood (18-22 July 44) and its adjunct, Operation Atlantic. Montgomery's plan for a grand breakout saw three British Armoured Divisions, supported by the heaviest air bombardment to date, throw themselves against the ridge. It was a defeat of catastrophic proportions.Montgomery lost over 500 tanks and 5,537 men.

Operation Atlantic (the Canadian effort in Goodwood) saw Foulkes' 2nd Division actually established on Verrières before being savaged by a counter-attack by the 1st SS Panzer Division. Observing the debacle that was Goodwood, General Simonds remarked to his ADC, "When my turn comes we will do it at night."

The main lesson of Goodwood: the importance of tank-infantry cooperation, was not immediately understood by 2nd Cdn Corps.

A careful review of Operation Spring suggested questions regarding its planning. Instead of an attack by the resources of fourarmoured and infantry divisions, Operational Orders issued by Simonds listed a series of phase line objectives to be captured by 2nd and 3rd Divisions. The Canadian force was confronted by two entrenched divisions - one a crack SS panzer formation. While the operation instructions to launch Spring came from General Simonds, specific tactical plans, that is brigade objectives, were drafted by the 2nd and 3rd Division Commanders, Foulkes and Keller.

The results of the battle are disturbing. Only one of the initial five objectives was captured and the Operation was a bloody failure:

total battle casualties of Operation "Spring" at about 1500, and the fatal casualties at about 450. Again excepting Dieppe, it was the Canadian Army's costliest day of operations in the Second World War.

C.P. Stacey

Chronologically, Operation Spring was sandwiched between Operations Atlantic (19 July) and Totalize (8 August) and appears to have been lost in popular history.

There are no references in most high school history texts. The details of this black day are generally unknown by Canadians. The decision made therefore, was to tell the story of Spring and examine the roleof the soldiers who fought it. This included the divisional commanders andLt-Gen Simonds.

Planning Operation Spring

Megill, who commanded 5 Brigade, notes that acomplete plan with routes and timings was handed down from division. It in turn had come from Corps. Megill believed the operation had been planned without reference to the terrain. His protests were overruled by Maj.-Gen. Foulkes, the divisional commander.

Copp and McAndrew

It has been suggested that In Desperate Battle implies General Keller is to blame for Spring's failure. This is not correct. Operation Spring was exclusively General Simonds' Operation. The aim was to crack the defences of Verrières; push the armour five miles south to the Cramesnil high ground; and, with good going, to drive for Falaise itself. In other words, a breakthrough, much like the American effort at St Lo. A synopsis of Operation Spring reveals the following:

Troops available to Simonds

1. Simonds had two infantry and two complete armoured divisions at his disposal.

The Enemy

2. The enemy consisted of two dug in divisions supported by panzer battlegroups as counterattack formations

The Mission

3. 2nd Cdn Corps would breakthrough the German front and drive south for Falaise. Simonds decided to attack at nightwith artificial moonlight and hopefully overwhelm the Germans by "First Tank Light". Strangely, the final plan called for the two Canadian infantry divisions to lead and launch a series of independent battalion attacks; timed one after the other against these defended positions.

Execution by the Divisional Commanders

4. General Keller ordered Brigadier Cunningham's 9th Brigade to secure Tilly. Brigadier Cunningham accordingly decided to assault Tilly with a single battalion (the North Nova Scotia) and notank support. Tilly was held by an armoured battlegroup from the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Panzer Division -- arguably the best formation in the entire German Army.

5. Foulkes' plan for 2nd Canadian Division called for a two brigade attack:

a. Megill's 5th Brigade to assault May-sur-Orne and Fontenay Le Marmion with two battalions (the Calgary Highlanders and The Black Watch) supported by one squadron of tanks. In the 2nd Division sector the attack ratio was:two individual Canadian battalion attacks against six German battalions and 19 Canadian tanks (a squadron) vs appx 45 German tanks.

b. The 4th Brigade was to assault the center of Verrières Ridge with one battalion (The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry) with no tank support against another armoured battlegroup from the 1st SS. The Royal Regiment of Canada, supported by a tank squadron, was then to attack Rocquancourt.

The lessons of Goodwood went unheeded as infantry attacked alone; armour operated as independent regiments or as isolated squadrons "in support".

General Foulkes had decided to attack with 2 Brigades up, but had stripped away a battalion from Megill (Le Regiment de Maisonneuve) and left him with two units (The Black Watch and the Calgary Highlanders) and two objectives. Megill now had no reserve and his start line was the responsibility of another brigade. After examining Foulkes' plan and visiting the front Megill raised some serious concerns:

Not only did we not own the start lines, but the whole thing was wide open and overlooked from high points, in fact....It meant the original objectives were impossible. Now we knew that. But Simonds never believed it. [Foulkes] was doing as he was told, I suppose.

Brigadier Megill

Whatever the actual tactical nuances introduced by the Divisional and Brigade Commanders, the attacks were ultimately approved by, and certainly the direct responsibility of the Commander of 2nd Canadian Corps, Lt.-General Guy Simonds.

The Tanks

Although he owned two complete British armoured divisions available to attack or counter-attack, Simonds plan was to use them only after the Canadian Infantry secured Verrières Ridge. The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigadewas broken up into individual squadrons and penny packeted around the Corps to support various phased infantry assaults.

Lt. General Simonds' philosophy for a Corps attack was presented in February 1944. His concept of operations in an attack against a strongly held line insisted on several principles:

1. defeating the German counter attack

2. artillery support must not be divided

3. a single thrust line with brigades in depth.

Operation Totalize (launched on 8 August 44) seemed to uphold this philosophy, but it is difficult to understand Spring's planning vis à vis this concept. The Brigade attacks were dispersed, not strongly supported and committed piece-meal.

With the odds seemingly stacked against it; 2nd Corp's launched Spring - resting its faith on surprise and artillery.

Executing "Operation Spring"

Looking at Canadian Army performance in Normandy up to the end of July 1944, it would seem fair to say that the lives of many soldiers were unnecessarily cast away.

John A. English

A study of Operation Spring (25 July 1944) will show the following:

Strategical Failure:

When the operation was cancelled, only one phase had been successfully completed and only one objective (of six) had been captured. There was no breakthrough to Falaise.

Tactical failure: the 3rd Division Assaults

1. The North Nova Scotia Regiment despite a valiant effort, was savagely beaten back by the 1st SS in Tilly. The Simonds' plan for Artificial Moonlight met with failure. Corps ordered continued efforts by 9 Brigade. When ordered to attackagain by General Keller, Brigadier Cunningham refused. Cunningham and two battalion commanders were subsequently sacked.

2. The Royal Regiment of Canada was ambushed and savagely thrown back when it attempted to attack its objective - the village of Rocquancourt.

Tactical failure: the 2nd Division Assaults

3. The 5th Brigade's attack was doomed from the start: The Camerons did not secure the start line.

4. Elements of one company of The Calgary Regiment reached May sur Orne but were forced back with heavy casualties.

5. The Black Watch was then ordered to attack and totally destroyed.

6. Finally, Foulkes ordered his Divisional reserve, Le Regiment de Maisonneuve to attack; it ran into a devastating counter attack by 9th SS Panzer.

Operational Leadership

The Divisional Commanders' reaction to their brigades' inability to crack the German defenses is, at best, indecisive. There are indications of confusion and frustration at 2nd Division's Tactical Headquarters because of inaccurate reports from their sub units -- particularly 5 Brigade. There may have been communications problems between Foulkes' Headquarters and the lower units; as well as with Simonds - but they could have been easily solved.

Foulkes' HQ was in the basement of a brewery in Fleury-sur-Orne approx 1100 yards, a 3 minute car ride, from Hill 67 and a grandstand view of Verrières, May, St Martin, and, St. André: the entire 2nd Division's front line. He never took that ride.

It must be remembered that on 25 July General Simonds was on Hill 67 watching the failure of the Calgary attack; the Black Watch's advance and destruction as well as Kampfgruppe Sterz's counter attack. He had a wealth of armour and artillery at his disposal. His subsequent inaction is a puzzle. The only directions issued by Simonds to 7th British Armoured Division - which was positioned near Beauvoir Farm and observed both the action of the Black Watch and the RHLI, was to support Rockingham in Verrières village. This the British did, albeit by single squadron rotation.

On the other side of the ridge, Simonds' opposite number, the commander of 1st SS Panzer Korps, Oberfuhrer Kramer acted with greater decision. He visited Verrières, demanded permission from his boss, General Kluge, to strike back. Kramer promptly ordered his reserve formation, 9th SS Panzer Division to counter-attack Simonds. The orders took Kramer less than 45 seconds to give.

A thorough reading of Stacey, Reginald Roy and archive documents shows clearly that the "Black Day" experienced by The Black Watch was but one tragedy of several in the assault on Verrières Ridge.

Responsibility in Spring : General Simonds

I have stated above that in the face of enemy strength as revealed by the attack there will be doubt as to whether the original final objective was attainable.

Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds

General Simonds wrote a secret evaluation of Operation Spring. This was intended to be part of a complete official explanation (ordered by the Minister of Defence) of why the attack failed. It was subsequently ordered destroyed (see below). His conclusions are interesting. Simonds firmly believed his plan of attack could have worked. Simonds' reasons for Spring's reverses:

That we failed to capture and hold May sur Orne and Tilly la Campagne and that we suffered what were, in my opinion, excessive casualties was due to a series of mistakes and errors of judgement in minor tactics.

General Simonds, in his defence of the plan for Operation Spring notes that there was one successful attack that reached its objective. Lt. Colonel Rockingham's Royal Hamilton Light Infantry attacked, captured and held on to the village of Verrières fending off at least four determined counter-attacks launched by battlegroups from 1st SS and 9th SS Panzer Divisions.

Simonds uses the sterling performance of the RHLI to prove that his plan, properly and determinedly executed, would have succeeded. Although it appears to be his central criticism against 5 Brigade's actions, Simonds declines to be more specific regarding what he means by "errors of judgement in minor tactics."

Given the success of Rockingham and Patton's breakout after St Lo, critics of In Desperate Battle suggest the film's pessimism tends to see the glass half empty. However the fact remains that Rockingham's was the only success of sixseparate attacks launched as part of Operation Spring.

Operation Spring was regarded as a breakthrough attempt by the Division and Brigade Commanders. It failed.

Simonds' "Holding Attack"

Of all operations of war the "holding attack" is that least understood by the layman for the casualties seem to be out of all proportion to apparent gains

Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds

Later, General Simonds declared Operation Spring a "holding Action", a complex set- piece battle designed to wrest away an important piece of ground and force the enemy to commit his reserves.

In hindsight, since General Omar Bradley launched Operation Cobra (the American breakout) on the same day as Spring (25 July) it may be argued that a successful holding action would draw off the German Panzer reserves to the eastern flank and enable the Americans to punch through. However, there was dispute in Canadian military circles as to Spring's actual intent. Most understood Spring to be an intended breakout that failed.

Simonds' insistence that the attack was a "Holding Attack" brought objections and complaints from some senior Canadians. General Foulkes held firm that Spring was presented by Simonds as "a breakthrough operation with prospects of success."

In an apparent direct rebuttal to Simonds; General Foulkes wrote to protest against reports that: "...blame the inefficiency of our troops for our misfortunes."

Blame Hidden : Report No. 150

Despite the argument between Simonds and Foulkes during and after Spring, both did agree to destroy a report that included Simonds' personal evaluation of the battle and direct criticism of the performance by the attacking battalions, particularly the Black Watch .

In a letter dated 21 Jan 46, Simonds wrote a three page critique for C.P. Stacey which was to be included as an appendix to Report No. 150, the official version of what happened and why. Simonds absolved his own performance but blamed Spring's failure and "unnecessary casualties" on "errors of judgement in minor tactics". Commenting on Griffin's assault, Simonds wrote: "The action of the Black Watch was most gallant but was tactically unsound in its detailed execution".

By 9 April 1946, after some harsh words between Foulkes (who was Chief of the General Staff and Simonds' superior) and Simonds, orders were given that the Simonds' comments, originally included as an appendix were to be "extracted and destroyed by order of CGS in accordance between CGS and Lt.-General Simonds". Report 150 was then classified "not to be released to non DND personnel."

Simonds' letter and the remaining copy of Report No. 150 have partially survived. It is not unrealistic to contend that someone has to bear responsibility for Spring's planning and execution. The question appears to be was it the attackers as represented by Griffin and Petch or was it the commanding Generals?

But Guy was as much to blame for the "Spring" mess as anyone. He hadn't done his homework.

Brigadier Foster

Simonds Assigning Blame: Major Phil Griffin

General Simonds' memo Attack by R.H.C. - Operation "Spring"puts the blame for failure on the shoulders of Major Phil Griffin:

The action of the Black Watch was most gallant but was tactically unsound in its detailed execution.

"Detailed execution" might have, perhaps should have, referred to Brigade or Divisional responsibility, but the subject is clearly The Black Watch. The only officer in the Black Watch who could conceivably be responsible for the "detailed execution" of the battalion's attack was Major Philip Griffin.

Simonds' accusation is perplexing. There are only a number of ways a battalion can advance across open country against direct fire; one of then is with support from a strong fire base (an area from which heavy direct fire is delivered against an enemy position allowing the attacking force to safely advance and close-assault) accurately engaging the enemy. Another is to be supported by overwhelming Artillery fire. To have both is immeasurably better.

General Simonds hadtwentyRegiments of artillery in addition to two armoured divisions available. Finally, Simonds was in a position to act decisively. Radio communications with his Headquarters were available and he was in an opportune location from which he could observe and direct the entire attack from Hill 67. He could have intervened. He did not.

Griffin's Battle Procedure

Given that Operation Spring was successively planned at Corps, Division and finally Brigade, there is little a battalion commander could have done. Major Griffin's attack was rushed: "Orders were issued in great haste." There is evidence to indicate the attack was launched before he was ready.

The adjutant of the Black Watch states that Griffin was harassed by a constant stream of orders and even visits by officers from higher headquarters in efforts to speed up the Black Watch attack.

I thus found myself receiving messages from Brigade (to pass on to Major Griffin) demanding an immediate attack and replies from Major Griffin (to pass back to brigade) explaining the situation...and stressing the foolhardiness of pressing an attack.

It should be remembered that the Black Watch "Start Line" (the St Martin area) was still not secure, the better part of two German Battalions were still entrenched in and around St Martin, St André and the Factory area . Griffin's hesitation was not based on in experience, rather, the exact opposite. On 15 July Griffin's company had been ordered to clear the town of Verson. He completed the operation and helped prepare a report on the techniques of house clearing. Griffin was well aware of the time necessary to secure St Martin and mounting casualties made clear the dangers of advancing into German fire. There was pressure on Griffin to attack.

Finally, I believe, Major Griffin came to the conclusion that the honour of the Regiment was at stake and ordered the attack to go forward.

Just as Griffin had completed his orders group he was visited by his Brigadier and Lt Colonel Neighswander, CO 5th Field Artillery. There was debate between Brigadier Megill and Griffin as to how the attack should proceed.

There appear to be two versions of what occurred during the meeting. Whatever the truth, it is difficult to accept that a Major was solely and primarily responsible for the execution of 2nd Canadian Division's Phase Two attack against Fontenay le Marmion.

General Simonds' critical comments on the Black Watch tactics -- which may refer to the Regiment's dogged determination to push through open fields while under heavy frontal and flanking fire are sad. Especially sad when it is remembered that the Black Watch behaved exactly as it was expected to. Two weeks earlier, General Simonds inspected the newly arrived battalion and urged them to "uphold their good name by... [their] conduct and... fighting."

If indeed the Black Watch was to be held responsible for its own debacle on the 25th, it may be useful to note that General Simonds was initially very critical of the way its own Divisional Commander handled the attack:

"uppermost in his mind [Simonds]... to get rid of General Charles Foulkes..." and "on at least three occasions Simonds confided in me that he was going to get rid of Foulkes."

Brigadier Foster

Portrayal of Major Griffin

It has been alleged elsewhere that the film's treatment of Major Griffin "victimizes him". In fact, In Desperate Battle is both a eulogy and celebration of Griffin's accomplishment. It was appreciated as such by his Regiment and his surviving family.

The burdens that accumulate on Major Griffin are carefully noted; beginning with the confusion at the sudden loss of the Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. Cantlie and the senior Black Watch Major.

Black Watch survivors claim that the Regiment attacked without artillery or armour support. Our research found evidence to the contrary. Major Griffin's plan for a combined arms attack was put into effect. Artillery support was fired by 5 Field RCA and was a repetition of the original fire plan. Canadian Armour support did arrive -- as planned, and confirmed by the former OC of B Squadron, 1st Hussars.

It has also been argued the film contends that Regimental pride was the single cause of the destruction of the Black Watch. This is incorrect. In Desperate Battle attempts to describe the following:

1. the loss of command and control when the Black Watch commanding officer, senior majors are cut down by enemy fire

2. the failure of the Camerons to secure the start line

3 the presence of underground tunnels and German activity near the shafts

4. the presence of an enemy battlegroup from 2nd Panzer Division

5. debate as to what actually occurred between Major Griffin and Brigadier Megill

6. the enemy flanking fire.

It is not suggested that esprit de corps the only reason for the Black Watch's persistence in its gallant assault, but there is some support for that thesis:

Another regiment, less intensely schooled in the traditions of a famous name, might have faltered and fallen back earlier. The Black Watch continued to advance to the top of the ridge.

Terry Copp and Robert Vogel

At issue is a clear appreciation of our military history. While it is true that Canadians won a great victory over the pride of the German Army, it is also important to appreciate the campaign with educated perspective.

Other Topics Reviewed by the Film

The Destruction of Caen

Winston Churchill intervened to say to Montgomery, you take Caen by Monday or you are out. Monty's reply was, but I will take it tomorrow if you will only give me what I require. What is that? queried Churchill. The heavy bombers, said Monty. You shall have them was the answer.

Air Commodore Kingston-McCloughry

The Canadian attack on Caen was preceded by a devastating air bombardment by "467 heavy bombers...2,562 tons of bombs". The medieval city was destroyed. French civilian casualties were high. Caen's bombing and occupation were not correctly reported to Canadians by our War Corespondents:

It's humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war. It was crap -- and I don't exclude Ernie Pyles or the Alan Mooreheads. We were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders. I suppose there wasn't an alternative at the time. It was total war. But, for God's sake, let's not glorify our role. It wasn't good journalism. It wasn't journalism at all.

Charles Lynch

The effect of censorship and accurate reporting of French civilian reaction to liberation by the Allies was evident throughout the campaign:

...just a waste of brick and stone, like a field of corn that had been plowed. The people gazed at us without emotion of any kind; one could hardly look them in the face, knowing who had done this. These were the people we came to free, and this was the price that freedom cost.

Caen was bombed for various reasons. There were obvious political pressures on General Montgomery. On the battlefield itself, troop's morale appears to be a dominant concern. The spires of Caen's cathedral were visible for miles and daily reminded Canadian infantry of the unattainable goal and their five weeks of failure. Caen was a major objective of D-Day but by 6 July had yet to be taken. Its bombing was very popular with in the trenches.

To the British and Canadian troops watching, the bombing was considered :

...wonderful for morale

War Diary: 3rd Cdn Inf Div

In addition to the material damage, much was hoped for ...from the tremendous moral effect on our own troops

Montgomery

The psychological effect on the (185) Infantry Brigade my Regiment was supporting was electrifying .... the noise and sight of the bombardment was a tremendous morale boost. Officers and soldiers were jumping out of their slit trenches and cheering.

Maj.-Gen Sir Nigel Tapp

It has been argued that Caen's bombing was necessary and saved Canadian lives. This may be true but is difficult to prove. After Caen was bombed there was no appreciable damage done to German defenders: the 12SS HJ withdrew in good order. The RAF had the bombings' effects studied by Air Commodore E.J. Kingston-McCloughry and S. Zuckermann for a report entitled: "Observations on the Bomber Command Attack on Caen, 7 July 1944". Their findings were:

Apart from the enormous lift given...the bombing made no material difference to the whole operation....could not understand why heavy bombing had been called for and...that not a single dead German or any enemy equipment had been found in the area that had been bombed.

S. Zuckermann

quoted in D'Este's Decision in Normandy

A review of operations in both First and Second World Wars shows that bombing cities generally produces more casualties rather than less: bombed buildings are reduced to mounds of rubble and become fortresses for defending troops who no longer fear a building might suddenly fall on their heads and bury them.

Bombed cities become obstacles that block the attackers progress - thereby effectively preventing a fast advance that over-runs dazed defenders.

The effect on the enemy is more doubtful...suffered only negligible casualties...after a short time nearly all of them were ready for action...But the matter had one tragic aspect -- the lamentable damage done to the city of Caen, and the inevitable casualties among French civilians. The havoc was great, the city's university among the buildings lost...The City was a pitiful spectacle.

C.P. Stacey

The Heavy Bomber Solution

The bombing of Caen is a good example of the naive belief held by the Allied ground commanders that mass air bombing was some kind of a panacea for armies locked in a stalemate with a determined enemy.

Further, it evolved into a crutch for ground offensives. The German Army eventually regarded as serious efforts only those operations that were preceded by a strike by strategic bombers. Senior Air Force officers had reservations:

Tedder believed that the heavy bombers should not be used except in exceptional circumstances to prevent a crisis, to break up an enemy attack, but not to prepare for an attack by our own troops.

However, whether at St Lo, Goodwood or Totalize massed air bombardment was as often a hindrance to attacking troops. Conversely, the Russian Army soundly defeated the Germans by depending on the one arm the Canadian Army had plenty of - artillery.

The capture of the northern half of Caen was of no immediate tactical benefit to Montgomery. For the moment all he had possession of was a ruined city and a symbolic victory.

Carlo D'Este

Epilogue

The Film

There are two distinct threads in "Normandy": the story of the veterans: Generals Dextraze and Radley Walters, and the battle for Normandy circa 7 June to 25 July.

1. Veterans : the first thread within the film examines the splendid accomplishments of our veterans against a skilled and determined enemy. Logically, the film joins Dextraze and Radley Walters on the beaches of Normandy (the beginning of their campaign) and leaves them at Falaise (the end of their campaign).

2. The Battles and the Leaders : the second thread centers on two specific battles and the Canadian officers in command: the counterattack of the 12SS on 7 June and the attacks against Verrières Ridge (Operation Spring) on 25 July. In Desperate Battle does not pretend to be a complete review of the entire campaign.

Selected Dates and Units

Several questions have arisen post factum regarding the specific dates and persona in In Desperate Battle:

1. The Enemy : why the emphasis on the 12SS "Hitler Jugend"?

2. The Chronology : why the limitation to battles fought on June 7th and July 25th

12th SS Hitler Jugend

The 12th SS HJ and the 1st Canadian Army's history are inexorably intertwined, from the shock of the first meeting on 7th June, to the last battles for Falaise. The 1st Canadian Army fought many German units; however, it was the 12 SS HJ that seemed to be its nemesis in the majority of the battles (Buron, Carpiquet, Le Mesnil Patry, Caen, Operations Windsor, Totalize, Tractable and the battles to close the Falaise pocket). The Hitler Jugend's record against our army is worth examining for several reasons:

- in action against Canadians from 7 June to 21 August 44

- prevented 3rd Canadian Division from taking Caen on D+1

- Kurt Meyer's leadership

- the shooting of Canadian prisoners and Meyer's subsequent trial

- frustrated General Simonds by denying him Falaise after initial success at Totalize and Tractable

- the skillful rearguard action which destroyed the remnants of the Hitler Jugend but prevented the Canadians from reaching Chambois on schedule and turning the "Falaise Gap" into a "Falaise Pocket".

Finally, since the many of the actions fought by Generals Dextraze and Radley Walters were against the 12 SS HJ, it was a logical choice.

Principle Characters

There has been reaction to the choice of actors and portrayal of Canadian "types" vs Germanic "types". Proper emphasis must be directed toward the principal characters in In Desperate Battle: Generals Dextraze and Radley Walters.

The Canadian fighting man, as represented by these two gentlemen, is treated with respect and sensitivity. It is difficult to imagine a more sympathetic portrayal.

The Film's Chronology: an evolution

Initially it was planned to chronicle the complete North West Europe campaign and perhaps include Italy. Preparations included extensive academic research, correspondence with Canadian and German historians, and a full summer in Europe for historical study. A detailed reconnaissance of the Normandy, Dieppe, the Scheldt, Holland and the Rhineland battlefields was conducted.

The preliminary investigation (which included visits to Canadian Forces Staff College in Kingston and a complete review of their Battlefield tours in France and Italy) made it clear that a two hour film could not adequately portray the complete European Campaign.

The subsequent decision was to concentrate on Normandy alone.

The emphasis on 7th June and 25 July

The Canadian success on D-Day is well known and well covered in films and writing. Meyer's Counter Attack on 7th June stopped the Canadian advance and established a stalemate that lasted until 8th July. Despite valiant attempts, subsequent British and Canadian efforts to breakout of the beach head failed. The first all Canadian Corps attack was Operation Spring. Considering Stacey's and Roy's description of 25 July as a "Black Day" for Canadian arms, it was decided that a hard look at the battle was required.

The film went on to investigate Operations Totalize, Tractable, the Capture of Falaise and the victory in the Falaise Gap. After a review of the initial rough cut it was decided that there was insufficient time to properly cover the entire Normandy campaign. The final decision was to cut the film in half and concentrate on the first two months and two specific actions: Meyer's counter attack on 7 June and Simonds' Verrières attack (Operation Spring) on 25 July.

Methodology

Readings: review of Canadian archive documents which included War Dairies, Radio Logs, Intelligence Summaries, and "after action" reports. A reading of secondary sources, including unpublished manuscripts. Extensive interviews with veterans throughout Quebec, Ontario and the Maritimes; correspondence in the form of questionnaires mailed to 200 known or presumed survivors of the Verrières Ridge assault (replies received originated across North America, England and even New Zealand).

Preliminary reconnaissance with Generals Dextraze and Radley Walters prior to shooting. The cooperation of the Canadian Forces was achieved only after correspondence and a detailed meeting with General de Chastelain (Chief, Canadian Defence Staff, Ottawa) wherein the director fully outlined the films concept and methodology.

In Desperate Battle was filmed in Montreal, Toronto, Canadian Forces Base Farnham, Canadian Forces Base Gagetown and on location in Normandy. The film crew spent nearly three weeks filming Normandy battlefields from the land, sea and air (via two Cdn Forces Kiowa helicopters). Interviews with German, French and Canadian veterans were conducted throughout: from the assault beaches to the "corridor of death" in the Falaise Gap. As stated above, time constraints prevented a presentation of the complete Victory Campaign.

It should be understood that the film's critical analysis is commensurate with more recent Canadian military histories.

Endnotes

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES, UNPUBLISHED

Government Records, Personal Papers, and Manuscript Collections

Record Group 24, National Defence 1870-1981, National Archives of Canada

RH 19 - 26, 1944. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiberg.

Military Documents, Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa

Crerar Papers, NAC

McNaughton Papers, NAC

Collected Papers, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, Kingston

Correspondence, Helmut Ritgen, Panzer Lehr, Moorkamp

Correspondence, Gerhard Stiller, 1 SS LAH, Stuttgart

Correspondence, Marshal Stearns and Dr. Reginald Roy

Collected Interviews Black Watch, Roman Jarymowycz, Montreal

Collected Interviews North Nova Scotia Regiment, Roman Jarymowycz, Montreal

Collected Interviews HQ 5 CIB; HQ 9 CIB, Roman Jarymowycz, Montreal

Collected Interviews Black Watch; 27th Armd Regt, Brian McKenna, Roman Jarymowycz, Montreal

PRIMARY SOURCES, PUBLISHED

Official Histories and Government publications

Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit, United States Army in World War II, The EuropeanTheatre of operations. Washington: Department of the Army, 1961.

Nicholson, Col. G.W.L. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol lI: The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945. Ottawa: Queen's printer, 1962.

Stacey, Col. C.P. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol I: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966.

_____.Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol III: The Victory Campaign: Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945. Ottawa: Queen's printer 1966.

_____.Arms, Men and Governments: The War policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974.

Manuals, Pamphlets, and Contemporary Periodicals

Canadian Army Training Memoranda

Canadian Defence Quarterly

Semi-Official Manuals and Associated Documents

Canadian Staff College Battlefield Tour : 2 Canadian Corps Operations Normandy June - August 1944 CFLCSC, Kingston

Bourne, Maj. R.P., and Maj. N.A. Shackleton. "Analysis of Firepower in Normandy Operations in 1944" NDHQ Operational Research and Analysis Establishment.

Memoirs, Journals and Accounts

Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story. New York: Simon and Schuster 1983

Burns, Lt-Gen E.L.M. General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars.Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970

Kitching, Maj-Gen. George. Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of George Kitching. Langley, B.C.: Battleline, 1986.

Montgomery, Field Marshal the Viscount. Memoirs. London: Collins, 1958

Stacey, C.P. A Date with History. Ottawa: Deneau, 1983

Tuker, Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis, Approach to Battle. London: Cassell, 1963

von Mellenthin, Maj.-Gen. F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armour in the Second World War, University of Oklahoma press, 1983

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books and Monographs

Barnett, Correli. The Collapse of British Power. New York: William Morrow, 1972.

Belfield, Eversley and H. Essame, The Battle for Normandy. London: Pan, 1983

Bernage, Georges. La Retraite Allemande. Normandie: Aôut 1944. Bayeux: Editions Heimdal,1988.

Benamou, Jean Pierre. Bataille de Caen. Bayeux: Editions Heimdal, 1988.

Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign of 1944-45. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979.

Bernage, George. Normandie Album Memorial 6 Juin-22 Aôut 44. Heimdal. Bayeux, 1989.

Bird, Will R. . No Retreating Footsteps - the story of the North Novas. Haunsport: Lancelot Press, 1987.

Broadfoot, Barry. Six War Years . Toronto: Doubleday, 1974.

Borsallo, J./Lassus, D. Camouflage Uniforms of the Waffen SS.Iso-Galago. London, 1986.

Burns, Maj-Gen E.L.M. Manpower in the Canadian Army 1939-1945. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1956.

Castonguay, Jacques and Ross, Armand. Le Regiment de la Chaudière. Levis: printed by the Regiment, 1983.

Campbell, J. Abbaye D'Ardenne June 1944. Buron: L'Association des Amis du Canada, 1984

Chamberlain, Peter; Ellis, Chris. Panzerkampwagen V Panther. Profile. London 1970.

_____. The Great Tanks. Hamlyn. London, 1971.

_____. Ram and Sexton. Profile. London, 1970.

Chappell, Mike. The Canadian Army at War. Osprey. London, 1985.

Cockran, Robert E. Canadian Gunner Battle School 1943-1945: The Italian Campaign and the

employment of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division's Artillery. Unpublished MA

Thesis, UNB, 1982.

Copp, Terry, and Bill McAndrew. Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the CanadianArmy, 1939-1945. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1990.

Copp, Terry, and Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise. Alma, Ont.: Maple Leaf Route, 1983.

____.Maple Leaf Route: Caen. Alma, Ont.: Maple Leaf Route, 1983.

English, John A., The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign - A Study of Failure in High Command. New York: Praeger 1991. (Casting of an Army)

____. On Infantry. Praeger, New York, 1981.

Fletcher, David. Tiger. HM Stationary Office. London 1986.

Davies, W.J.K. The German Army Handbook 1939-1945. Aero. New York, 1981.

D'Este, Carlo. Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. London: Pan, 1984.

Duguid, Col A. Fortescue. History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards 1760-1964. Montreal: Gazette Printing Company, 1965.

Florentin, Eddy. The Battle of the Falaise Gap. London: Elek, 1965.

Foster, Tony. Meeting of Generals. Toronto: Methuen, 1986.

Furbringer, Herbert.9.SS-Panzer-Division 1944: Normandie. Heimdal. Bayeux, 1988.

Gouin, Jacques. Bon Coeur et Bon Bras: Histoire du Regiment de Maisonneuve 1880-1980. Montreal: Mediabec, 1980.

Goulin, Jacques. Bon Coeur et Bon Bras - Histoire du Regiment de Maisonneuve 1880-1980. Published by the Regiment. Montreal, 1980.

Granatstein, J.L. and Morton, Desmond. Bloody Victory - Canadians and the D-Day Campaign 1944. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1984.

Gravel, Jean Yves. Histoire du Regiment de Trois Rivières. Editions du Bien Public. Trois Rivières, 1981.

Grove, Eric. World War II Tanks. MacDonald and Co. London, 1976.

Greenhous, Brerton and Brown, Kingsley. Semper Paratus. The History of the RHLI. Hamilton: RHLI Historical Association, 1977.

Hamilton, Nigel. Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944. Sevenoaks, U.K.: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983.

Harris, Steven J. Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional army 1860-1939. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.