The Valour and the Horror

The Valour and The Horror

Specific criticisms of the film, dealing with alleged errors of fact, have been compiled, and are answered in this Supplement. Because the same criticisms have frequently come from more than one source, and in an attempt to keep the responses as impersonal as possible, the source of the criticism is not indicated. The criticisms are in bold, the responses, in normal font.

Criticism: Some have criticized the film's narrative introduction to Sir Arthur Harris, which follows,

In 1940, German bombers were laying waste to the City of London in the siege that became known as the "blitz." Churchill decided that even more devastating attacks against German cities was the only way to win the war. To accomplish this task he chose the ruthless Sir Arthur Harris as head of Bomber Command.

Critics point out that Harris did not become head of Bomber Command until 22 February 1942, and claim that Churchill had little or nothing to do with the appointment.

Response: The writers of the film are and were aware of the date of Harris's appointment. For narrative compression, the story justifiably moves from the Blitz to the appointment of Arthur Harris some 18 months later. And while it was Portal who personally approached Harris with the job offer, war appointments at that level would hardly have been made without Churchill's input. As Harris told Max Hastings in 1978, Portal's reply when Harris accepted the offer was: "Splendid! I'll go and tell Winston at once."

Criticism: Air Marshal Harris never disobeyed orders to redirect his attacks on targets other than area bombing.

Response: In fact, Harris often did circumvent or disobey such orders. (See section on "Effectiveness of Area Bombing" particularly regarding the Oil Plan, and section on "Bomber Harris").

Criticism: There never was a policy in the Air Ministry to have Bomber Command direct their attacks on the German populace; nor was the intent of their policy withheld from the aircrew and general public.

Response: In truth, there were several such directives issued in 1942 and 1943. Their intent was indeed withheld. (See sections on "Policy and Morality of Area Bombing" and "The Secrecy of Area Bombing").

Criticism: The Hamburg raids of July/August 1943 were not planned any differently than former raids, and the city's submarine construction yards were the target of Bomber Command.

Response: Untrue on both points. Hamburg marked the first use of "window" by the bombers to circumvent German radar defenses, as well as the first combined raid by RAF and American Bombers. Further, it was the densely populated areas of the city, not the submarine yards, that were targeted by Bomber Command. (See section on "The Hamburg Raids").

Criticism: Some critics have played down the Air Ministry's use of Lack of Moral Fibre (LMF) as it was applied to bomber airmen who broke under the incredible strain.

Response: The point made in the film is that the system itself, no matter how many airmen it was applied to, was cruel and heartless. (See section on "Lack of Moral Fibre"). The sentiment has been echoed by Senator Richard Doyle, himself a Bomber Command veteran, who points out that in his experience, the threat of LMF "was used with great abandon in the training process of the air force." Moreover, said Senator Doyle, "That designation, phrased as it was, was not one of the great glories of the RCAF or the RAF as we knew it."

Criticism: Some critics have also objected to the film sequence involving air gunner Martin ("Joe") Favreau's description of anti-French Canadian comments that he sometimes encountered. Critics have claimed that any such derogatory statements might have been made in jest, but were not viewed as derogatory by the people themselves.

Response: How Joe Favreau or any other French Canadian viewed "words used in jest" can surely best be determined by them. In any case, the film never suggests that francophobic sentiments were the norm or even frequent in Bomber Command - only that sometimes, as testified to by Favreau, the situation did occur.

Criticism: Area bombing of German targets is presented in the film as if precision bombing was a viable alternative early in 1942 and 1943.

Response: The film does not claim that precision bombing was a viable alternative early on in the war. In fact, the narration states explicitly that "In 1943, ... The dropping of bombs from very high altitudes was not very glamorous, or very effective ... most bombs missed their targets by at least five miles."

That precision bombing was not entirely feasible early in the war in no way undermines the film's implied criticism of the policy of area bombing. The saturation bombing of cities (versus precision bombing of military/industrial targets) may well have been technically easier, safer and more feasible during most of the war. But surely humanitarian considerations should be factored into the equation.

The point is, an argument based on the premise: "That was all we could do with what we had at the time", is legitimately open to post-facto analysis and debate. Our film is following a well-beaten path in its implied argument against the necessity, effectiveness and morality of the bombing Germany's civilian centers.

Criticism: The narration incorrectly claims that the 545 men of Bomber Command killed during the Nuremburg raid was a greater number than those lost in the Battle of Britain.

Response: The reference here is to the widely accepted figure of 537 fighter pilots lost during the skirmishes over Britain and the English Channel. Both Martin Middlebrook in his definitive The Nuremburg Raid, and Anthony Cave Brown in Bodyguard of Lies, used similar phrases to characterize the losses over Nuremburg.

There were also a whole series of criticisms which have sprung from some critics' determination to see certain things in the film that are not there. Although such attacks on "phantom" aspects of film have left the producers speechless, they are included here for completeness:

Criticism: The film "claims" that aircrew were not aware that people, including German civilians, were being killed by their bombing.

Response: No such claim is made in the film.

Criticism: The film "claims" that Bomber Command veterans all became drunks and drug addicts and other derelicts after the war.

Response: No such claim is made in the film.

Criticism: The film "implies" that Air Marshal Harris never attempted to do precision bombing.

Response: No such implication is made in the film.

Criticism: The film makes the misrepresentation that Sir Arthur Harris was a man responsible for formulating bombing policy.

Response: The film makes so such misrepresentation. In fact the film states, through Harris's own words: "Such decisions of policy are not made by commanders in chief in the field, but by ministries, by the Chiefs of Staff committee and by the War Cabinet."

Criticism: The film says that by continuing area bombing, our crews yielded the moral high ground to Hitler, and that in carrying out the hazardous duties their government assigned them, Bomber Command airmen descended to a lower moral plane than the Germans.

Response: No such statements were made. What Freeman Dyson specifically states in the film is that "The (German) night fighters... ended the war morally undefeated. They had the advantage of knowing what they were fighting for, not, in those last weeks of the war, for Hitler, but for the preservation of what was left of their homes and families, their cities and their people. We had given them, at the end of the war, the one thing they lacked at the beginning, a clean cause to fight for."

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