The Valour and the Horror

The Valour and The Horror

Specific criticisms of the Normandy film, dealing with alleged errors of fact, have been compiled, and are answered in this Supplement. Because the same criticisms have frequently come from more than one source, and in an attempt to keep the responses as impersonal as possible, the source of the criticism is not indicated. The criticisms are in bold, the responses, in normal font.

Criticism: Some critics have taken exception to the following narrative line: "For many Canadians, patriotism and adventure were not on their minds when they decided to join the army. It was the Depression - there was no work little food, and the Army represented a steady paycheck."

Response: It should first be noted that the film cites three different stories as examples of soldiers joining up. The first two are Generals Radley Walters and Dextraze. They joined for patriotic reasons. The third example was Joseph Le Bouthillier.

There is abundant support for the film's assertion that many were in the same predicament as Le Bouthillier, joining because they were hard up.

After interviewing scores of veterans for his book Six War Years 1939-1945, author Barry Broadfoot concludes:

For most of them, joining up was a great opportunity to be useful again, to get away from the Depression and wear clean clothes and eat three good meals a day.

Note that Broadfoot goes as far as to use the word "most," not "many" as is used in the film.

In Bloody Victory, historians J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton observe:

Some had enlisted only because the army promised 'three squares a day', a major consideration after years of unemployment during the Depression.

The third source is the oral history, J'ai vécu la guerre, by Ronald Cormier. This is the book where the scriptwriters discovered Corporal Le Bouthillier. To back up Le Bouthillier, there is an account from another Acadian soldier Lorenzo Roussel:

I was in debt. I was depressed because there wasn't any work. Everyone said it would be best to join the army.

Criticism: It has been claimed that the narration implies that Halton admitted that he was a cheerleader for a cause and not a journalist at all.

Response: We document that the film makes no such claim. What must be emphasized is the necessity, in film, of taking visual switches into account.

The film makes no attempt to describe Halton's post war feelings. The important juxtaposition is the picture on the screen when the narration is being read. The photograph reveals two Canadian war correspondents in their army uniform, as the script says, "behind the generals". The men are Ross Munro and Charles Lynch. In a conversation with Terence McKenna preparing for a Journal WWII documentary, Munro said he was ashamed of his coverage during the war. As for Lynch, he told Philip Knightley in The First Casualty:

Its humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war. It was crap. at the start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders...It wasn't good journalism. It wasn't journalism at all.

Criticism: It is untrue that half the regiment (the Queen's Own Rifles) lay wounded or dead following the D-Day landing.

Response: This is military short hand. For example after the cataclysm on Verrières Ridge a Black Watch officer told us: "We lost the battalion that day." His reference is to the ridge attack that cost the Black Watch 300 of the 325 men attacking, while the Black Watch battalion actually had a strength of some 900 soldiers. So the battalion "lost" was the section of the battalion that attacked. Similarly with the Queen's Own Rifles on the D-Day beach.

At D-Day, the assaulting battalions, like the Black Watch later on the Ridge, attacked with an average of 300 men in each regiment. The Queen's Own Rifles' casualties were 61 killed and another 82 wounded, a total of 143 casualties. Thus, in the parlance of the battlefield, half the regiment lay wounded or dead.

Criticism: Kurt Meyer did not command the 12th SS on 7 June, 1944.

Response: This is true. However, a close reading of the film's transcript indicates that what the narration says is:

Rushing to meet the Canadians were the tanks of the 20,000 strong Hitler youth division... commanded by Kurt Meyer. Meyer would become the nemesis of the Canadian Army in Normandy. Meyer was a personal favorite of Adolf Hitler,not only because he was the best of Nazis, but because he was the best of soldiers.

That is, that Kurt Meyer was commanding the tanks that were rushing to meet the Canadians, which is an accurate statement.

Criticism: It is inaccurate to assert that the 12 SS Hitler Jugend was the most famous German division.

Response: The narration in fact characterizes the 12 SS Hitler Jugend as "one of Germany's most famous divisions." It is true that before Normandy, the 12 SS Hitler Jugend was relatively unknown. However, by August 1944, it had become as famous, or notorious, as any of the other SS divisions. After the campaign, and the Meyer trial, the 12 SS HJ became synonymous with Normandy -- probably the only SS panzer division most Canadians can actually name. It is indeed fair to argue that to most Canadians who have a direct or passing understanding of the campaign, the 12 SS was, in fact, "one of Germany's most famous divisions."

Criticism: Donald Pearce, who is depicted in the film commenting on events taking place in Normandy during the summer of 1944, was not in Normandy until later that year.

Response: Donald Pearce, author of Journal of a War, writes in his book the following: "I write the following pages between June 1944 and May 1945 while on active service with the Canadian Army Overseas as an infantry platoon commander."

Pearce began the Battle of Normandy in England waiting for the call: "There are about 500 hundred of us here. We rise and shine each morning and proceed to sit around under these huge oak trees in frank idleness day after day, and wait for enough men and officers to be killed in Normandy for us to trickle back into the real army."

The call came, and on August 27, Donald Pearce embarked for Normandy. On his way to the front, as the script accurately notes, he passed the ruins of Caen, and the film quotes his observations on that bombed and desolate city.

Donald Pearce was only in Normandy for a short time, but as the excerpts make clear, this is where his war began. It has been claimed by some critics that this journal was written years after the war. This is untrue. In fact, Pearce's testimony on Normandy and the entire campaign in North West Europe is extremely valuable since it was written in the heat of action while the memories were fresh. Few such journals exist, as it was a court martial offence to keep them.

Criticism: Some critics have objected to the narrative assertion that "Wounded soldiers were often sent back to the front before they had any chance to recover."

Response: There is abundant evidence to support this assertion. This despite the fact that a thorough search of the archives makes it clear that few officers were willing to put down in an official report the unattractive dimensions of the reinforcement crisis. In his Normandy book, Col. English cryptically observes:

There is good reason to believe that thrice wounded soldiers were sent back into the line.

But it's clear that both in Normandy and in the savage battle for Italy the reinforcement crisis had a ruthless dimension. On December 26, 1943, General Foulkes senior doctor reported that:

Reinforcements were arriving from convalescent Depots...with open wounds, limitation of movement and unfit for duty.

In Normandy, a war diary from the 2nd Cdn Infantry Div. provides further evidence:

Major J. Jose, OC 4 Cdn FDS is doing a very good job of "screening" casualties and is returning a large proportion of exhaustion and minor sickness and injury to the Divisional Company of the Reinforcement Battalion.

Criticism: There have been attacks on the film's depiction of the senior Canadian officers' attitudes to psychiatric breakdown in the film.

Response: The film did not attempt to document the entire story of the Canadian Army's policy on psychiatric casualties. It would be impossible to duplicate the hundreds of pages of literature that have been written on this subject in a few paragraphs of screen time. What we were attempting to show was the attitude of Canada's senior officers in Normandy, especially General Simonds. The evidence to support this depiction comes from Copp and McAndrew in Battle Exhaustion: Psychiatrists and Soldiers in the Canadian Army 1939-1945.

Information as to the number of courts-martial for malingering lies in Trials by Court Martial records that are still secret. However, examples of support for our comments in the film, extracted from Battle Exhaustion, are as follows:

The senior officers of the Corps and 2nd Canadian Division had decided that psychiatric casualties were largely the creation of psychiatrists...

...rising exhaustion rate Simonds was adamant that tighter discipline and exemplary punishment were required...

... I will not condone malingering or straggling and I request that you will give your personal attention to this matter and take active steps to see what disciplinary action is taken and examples made wherever offences occur.

-- Simonds memo to Divisional Commanders

29 August 1944

The minimum period of penal servitude is three years and the maximum is life.

- Crerar to Simonds Sept 2, 1944

Criticism: Some critics have objected to the following narration: "On one flank, a single German armored division held back a huge American army. In front of the Canadians and British at Caen were no less than six German armored divisions," claiming that it implies that the German armoured division held back the Americans by itself.

Response: The intent here was to illustrate the deployment of Panzer divisions along the entire front and illustrate that the vast bulk were in the Canadian sector. It must be seen in context, and with the accompanying narration. The filmmakers were very aware of the presence of other formations. A map was produced that showed every Corps, but it proved too cluttered for television. It was decided to use the "panzer divisions only" map. The same technique is used by Montgomery in his Memoirs.

Criticism: Critics have questioned the characterization that Simonds was under heavy political pressure for a quick victory. The narration states:

Allied commander Bernard Montgomery was under enormous pressure from Prime minister Winston Churchill for a break out victory.

The man of the hour was the Canadian General highly regarded by the British: Guy Simonds. Under heavy political pressure for that quick victory Simonds was about to make some tragic mistakes.

Response: The pressure on the Allied commanders was felt first by the overall ground commander, General Bernard Montgomery. Some historians have presented a case that, in fact, Montgomery was in danger of loosing his head if he didn't get the Canadians under General Simonds and the Brits moving on the left flank. The pressure felt by Montgomery to "get going or get out" reached a crescendo a few weeks later. Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery's biographer sets the scene:

July 1944 was to be a month of tremendous strain for Monty... even the staunchest heart began to weaken, tongues to wag and fingers of suspicion be pointed at the Eighth Army commander.

On July 6, a brouhaha over Montgomery's strategy flared up when Churchill met his war lords and senior cabinet members in a bunker below Westminster. V-2 rockets were hitting London with terrifying regularity, reminding Churchill of the desperate need to break out of Normandy and capture the launching areas for the German rockets in France. According to Martin Gilbert, Churchill's principal biographer, the meeting began with the prime minister "abusing Montgomery, 'because operations were not going faster' and because 'apparently Eisenhower had said he was overcautious.'" Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke was forced into an extraordinary defence of Montgomery:

I flared up, and asked him if he could not trust his generals for five minutes instead of continuously abusing them and belittling them... he [Churchill] was infuriated...

Eisenhower's unhappiness with Montgomery's pace was gentle compared to General George Patton who wrote in his diary after visiting Montgomery's headquarters:

Montgomery went to great lengths explaining why the British had done nothing.

In the face of his critics, Montgomery was trying to keep a cool hand. The bombing and subsequent capture of Caen distracted them for a short while, but once again the pressure began to mount on Montgomery to break-out of the German encirclement. His next major battle was a tank offensive named Goodwood. Once again, heavy bombers would set the table for the offensive. The battle was scarcely underway on July 18 when Montgomery issued a press communique declaring a victory.

Early this morning British and Canadian troops of the Second Army attacked and broke through into the area east of the Orne... General Montgomery is well satisfied with the progress...

On July 19, the headline in the Times of London reflected what all the Allied war correspondents were being fed:

SECOND ARMY BREAKS THROUGH

It had not happened. Once again the superb German armoured divisions had stopped the British attack even as it was leaving the gate, brewing up hundreds of poorly armoured Sherman tanks. Writes Hamilton:

With the closing down of Goodwood, the roof began to fall about Monty's ears... Monty was now forced to bat for his life, not against the enemy, but against his superiors... Eisenhower's British and American aides were openly discussing 'who would succeed Monty'.

Eisenhower himself was reported being as "blue as indigo". Major General Francis deGuigand, Montgomery's chief of staff, wrote in his memoirs:

There was no doubt feelings were mounting about Monty, and suggestions that possibly he's had enough and they ought to appoint someone else. I was aware of it, and so was he.

On July 20, Churchill flew to Normandy for a high level conference with his army commander. Confirmation of what was truly in the prime minister's mind will once again have to wait until the release of Churchill's wartime papers, but the scuttlebutt was alarming: Churchill had come for Montgomery's head. Captain John Henderson was Monty's Aide de Camp:

It was common knowledge that Churchill had come to sack Monty. I mean we all knew it. He came in his blue coat with a blue cap, and in his pocket he had an order, dismissing Monty. There was quite an "atmosphere".

Whether or not the order ever existed, there is no doubting the "atmosphere". This was the stage for the Canadian Operation Spring, on July 25th, and the U.S. offensive code-named Cobra. During the prime minister's atmospheric trip to Normandy, Montgomery introduced Churchill to his favourite Canadian Commander, General Guy Simonds. They were photographed together as Churchill was briefed on Operation Spring, the new plan for a battle and as the script observes, the stakes were high. The political pressure felt by Montgomery most certainly can be said to apply to Simonds as well. As it turned out the Canadian attack was a debacle, but the Americans broke out under General Patton on that same day. Churchill and the Allied high command were pleased at this turn of events, and Montgomery's position as Allied ground commander in Normandy was secured.

Criticism: There has been objection to the following sequence:

SIMONDS (drama):

Some visiting Russian army officers asked me, by how much did we outnumber the enemy. I said, by three to one. They were greatly surprised. They said they wouldn't attack unless they outnumbered the Germans by at least five or six to one.

NARRATION:

Reducing the attack ratio from 5 or 6 to 1 down to 3 to 1 would further endanger the lives of every man in the Canadian attack.

Critics argue that to question the Canadian command for not putting even more troops into the field against the Germans is ridiculous because the Allies' armies could not muster the kind of ratio suggested.

Response: This is indeed a complex point, just as SPRING was a complex battle. However, although it is true that with 4 divisions at his disposal, the best Simonds could do was muster 2 to 1 against the Germans holding Verrières, other questions remain:

- Why attack two dug in divisions at worse than 2 to 1 odds?

- Why not attempt local superiority?

It is very clear that SPRING was a CORPS HQ plan. Why then does Simonds have the North Nova Scotia battalion attack Tilly when experience at Carpiquet shows that this type of an objective requires a minimum brigade attack?

An obvious question is why task a single battalion, the Camerons, to clear the start line (St.Andre -St.Martin: two large villages) for 2nd Division when it was well known the area was held by the 272nd (Wermacht) Infantry Division. Clearing the start line was clearly a brigade task.

Attacking May, let alone both May and Fontenay was another brigade, if not division, task. The final question is why didn't Simonds use the massed armour at his disposal to support the Black Watch?

There is much room for criticism regarding the planning and tactical handling of the battle by Simonds' HQ.

In fact, In Desperate Battle echoes crtiticisms that were initially suggested by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel in Falaise:

It was no doubt mainly the Germans who were responsible for the difficulties encountered by II Canadian Corps during July and August, but the Canadian commanders were far from blameless.

Simonds had laid down as "Operational Policy" for the Corps in an attack on a strong German position shortly after assuming command. A close reading of this directive will show that the General had fully grasped the principles of dealing with the German Army when it had decided to stand and fight. The principles outlined by Simonds were certainly prominent in the preparation ofOperation Totalize, the battle which made Simonds' reputation, but there is little evidence that they were applied during the battles of July.

Criticism: Simonds' use of a technique called artificial moonlight was not "improvised."

Response: In preparation for the film, the researchers interviewed dozens of Black Watch and North Nova Scotia infantry survivors of the failed attack on Verrières Ridge. All confirmed that there was absolutely no rehearsal of the searchlight operation, despite the fact they had been training for years in England. For every infantryman the lights were a sudden, shocking surprise.

Simonds is in fact noted for his improvisational tactics: the night attack at Totalize: kangaroo APCs, lights, flares and trace to indicate direction, closed assault columns; the day attack at Tractable: massed armour phalanxes and smoke.

The film is correct in suggesting that operations conducted by Simonds were often complex, were not rehearsed, and did not always succeed. While there was obviously no time or space to rehearse for Spring in Normandy, it is also true that there was no formal preparation for attacks of this scope in England either. As the film points out, the General took a risk with green troops.

On the basis of all the available evidence, the film's assertion stands: "the improvised searchlight plan would result in the death of dozens of soldiers."

Criticism: The depiction of Keller as a drunk was patently unfair.

Response: The film's point was that Keller was not competent to command a division, and as we have seen, there is considerable evidence to support this. It is conjecture whether the actor's depiction shows a drunk Keller, or simply Keller as described by his British superiors:

Indeed the Division [Keller's 3rd CID] was a reflection of the state of its Commander ... obviously not standing up to the strain and showed signs of fatigue and nervousness (one might almost say fright) which were patent for all to see."

-- General Crocker, 5 July 1944

Further, the archival evidence documenting Keller's use of alcohol has been available in the archives for decades. Keller had earned a black mark on his record for drunkenness, and was upbraided by his mentor, General Harry Crerar:

... if Maj.-Gen. Keller had been a Non-Permanent Force Officer, his misbehaviour in the matter of over-indulgence would long ago have been brought to official attention and action.

In a milieu where heavy drinking was an accepted part of the scene, it must have taken some considerable excesses for Crerar to put on the record criticism of a protegé like Keller.

Criticism: The Cunningham-Keller scenes are wholly fictional.

Response: This is absolutely untrue. These scenes are based on an interview with Brigadier Cunningham. They were described and subsequently attested to by him.

In 1990, a military officer conducting research for our series interviewed Brigadier Cunningham at length. After the film was broadcast we visited the brigadier and inquired whether he would be willing to put on the record his own critique of the manner in which we had depicted his story as well as the general thrust of the Normandy episode. Brigadier Cunningham, a lawyer, said he would watch the film a second time before offering this critique. On June 22, he signed a letter which included the following remarks:

I served under General Guy Simonds, the commander of 2nd Canadian Corps, and General Rod Keller, the commander of the 3rd Canadian Division. I knew them well, particularly General Keller.

In my view, the film offers a factual account of the events that I personally participated in, and is a fair and accurate portrayal of the officers involved.

Brigadier Cunningham was well aware of the impact of his letter. The substance of the letter was published in both the Toronto Star and the Kingston Whig-Standard, Brigadier Cunningham's home town newspaper. He died a month later, but the Brigadier had expressed satisfaction to his wife and son Ian that he had taken this action.

Criticism: Inaccurate to claim that "Simonds sent one of his Brigadiers to get Griffin moving."

Response: The radio logs documenting all the orders flowing from Simonds' corps headquarters to the divisions and from the divisions to the brigades, and from the brigades to regiments like the Black Watch provide overwhelming support that there was pressure coming from on high to press home Simonds' plan of attack for Operation Spring, and get Griffin to hurry the Black Watch into Fontenay.

Finally, Brigadier Megill does come forward to visit Griffin. The film attempts to show that the BW's delay (over four hours) was a major concern at both 5 Brigade (Megill) and 2nd Cdn Div (Foulkes) Headquarters. There is evidence to place Simonds in 2nd Div HQ during this time. His impatience with Foulkes was noted by the staff. It is not unfair or inaccurate to suggest that Megill's visit may have been prompted by Foulkes' impatience which was in turn affected by Simonds' presence.

Major Campbell Stuart, the Black Watch officer responsible for radio communication between the High Command and Griffin wrote us a letter describing the pressure on Griffin from Brigadier Megill.

I thus found myself receiving messages from Brigade [to pass on to Major Griffin] demanding an immediate attack and replies from Major Griffin [to pass back to Brigade] explaining the situation, emphasizing the lack of Calgary success and stressing the foolhardiness of pressing an attack. The frequency and the repetitious nature of the messages from Brigade became such that I ended up passing only about 25% of them to Major Griffin - who was fully occupied in attempting to clear the Forming-Up area. During this period there were two visits from Brigade liaison officers but I did not have the impression that they had any clear understanding of what was going on - or perhaps their visits were merely intended to increase the pressure.

Finally, I believe, Major Griffin came to the conclusion that the honour of the Regiment was at stake and ordered the attack to go forward. I know that when the Brigadier came up shortly after, undoubtedly to give a direct order to attack, Major Griffin was greatly relieved to be able to report that he had already issued the orders.

Criticism: Objections to the following line of narration: "On the right overlooking the battlefield was the town of May. The Black Watch were told that it too was in Canadian hands."

Response: There is significant substantiation of this point. 5 Brigade Headquarters, based on reports from the Calgary Highlanders, believed Canadians were in May. RHC was on the 5 Brigade net and monitored earlier Calgary sitreps. Eventually, there was confusion at all levels. Griffin sent an officers' patrol into May. The information given him was that there were no Germans in May but a machine gun in a building on the east sector of the town could fire onto the BW startline (which was the top of Verrières Ridge). It is fair to say that at the time of the Megill-Griffin interview in St.André, both felt that May was not held by the Germans.

Criticism: Untrue to say that "The entire ridge was honeycombed with mine shafts, allowing the Germans to move around the battlefield undetected." Further, image used in film not remotely like what actually existed.

Response: The entire ridge was indeed honeycombed with mine shafts. In The Victory Campaign, C.P.Stacey's official account of the battle, the army historian describes a "labyrinth of mine tunnels".

Bitter and confused fighting went on in the dark among the buildings of St André-sur-Orne and St Martin-de-Fontenay. In this area there was a special problem. Its defensive strength was increased by the presence of iron mines and quarries, and it was subsequently found that a mine-shaft in a group of buildings usually called "the Factory" directly south of St André was connected with extensive underground workings. These and other tunnels (including one leading from Rocquancourt to May-sur-Orne), along with air-shafts connecting with the surface, gave the enemy means of moving troops under cover from one section of his front to another, and of re-occupying positions after we cleared them.

On our investigation of the battlefield, we contacted the mine manager and he confirmed that in 1944, as it is today, mine tunnels connect St. André and St. Martin as well as the village of May-sur-Orne, and in fact a shaft stretches all the way beyond the Black Watch objective at Fontenay-le-Marion.

Support for the film's portrayal is also found in Copp and Vogel's Maple Leaf Route: Falaise:

The enemy had survived the artillery barrage by hiding in the extensive mine workings which dotted the area and were able to use underground mine tunnels and ventilation shafts to infiltrate small groups into and behind the battle.

The Black Watch, moving up to prepare for their advance which was scheduled for first light, found themselves embroiled in the struggle to deal with enemy troops who continued to appear from underground.

In an attempt to demonstrate the German use of tunnels to reinforce their positions, In Desperate Battle shows Germans moving through communication tunnels instead of mine shafts. It must be appreciated that no footage of German troops advancing through dark mine tunnels was available.

Criticism: The brilliant achievement of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was left out. The Calgary Highlanders were also ignored.

Response: As has been discussed in the main body of this document, the film must be judged against its stated definition, which is to examine the Battle of Verrières Ridge, and other unnamed "cataclysms that befell the Canadian army in Normandy in the summer of 1944."

The script set out to document the second blackest day for the Canadian Army in the Second World War. The script celebrated senior officers like Brigadier Cunningham, who's courage shone like a beacon in the midst of this epic disaster. The script did not "carefully skip over" any part of the story necessary to comprehend the operation and the reasons for its failure. If this was an academic treatise, the twelve hour script would have dealt with every regiment in the battle. Nothing can diminish the fact that when the operation was finally abandoned only one objective of six had been captured and that Simonds' dream of a breakthrough had turned into a nightmare for the Canadian Army.

Criticism: Unfair to assert that General Simonds never answered his critics, as he did write a detailed analysis of Spring that remains available in archives.

Response: General Simonds wrote an analysis of Operation Spring blaming the debacle on junior officers, as detailed in the main body of this document. He never answered the larger questions of strategy and tactics raised in the aftermath of many troubling defeats in Normandy, what Col. English describes in the subtitle of his book: the "failure in high command". Many of those answers were expected in the memoirs he was preparing. Unfortunately his death on 15 May 74 came before he had finished any chapters beyond his early career. It thus seems fair to say that General Simonds never answered his critics.